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STATUTE OF FRAUDS UNDER SALES ACT
THE APPLICATION OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
UNDER THE UNIFORM SALES ACT
By L. VoLD*
Sec. 1. SPECIAL FORMALITIES UNNECESSARY
A CONTRACT to sell or a sale of goods may be made, in the ab-
sence of special statutory requirements, by mere informal
agreement. No special form is necessary.- The deal may be oral.'
It may be in writing.3 It may be manifested by conduct of the
parties. It may appear in any combination of these forms which
the parties may see fit to employ.4 Aside from the statute of
frauds, the only importance of a writing in this connection is to
furnish more satisfactory evidence of the terms of the bargain
than oral testimony based on memory could afford. Special for-
malities for certain types of sales may for particular reasons be
imposed by statute,' but for sales of goods in the ordinary course
in current commercial dealings between buyers and sellers no
special statutory requirements as to form have been imposed be-
yond what is included in the statute of frauds.
Sec. 2. THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS AFFECTING SALES OF GOODS
The type of legislation bearing the name of the statute of
frauds requires that certain transactions, to be enforceable, must
be evidenced by a writing. Historically this legislation is derived
*Professor of Law, University of Nebraska, Lincoln, Nebraska.
'Uniform Sales Act, Sec. 3.2Fred Allen Automobile Supply Co. v. H. W. Johns-Manville Co.,
(1918) 211 Ill. App. 217 (automobile batteries); Rosenfeld v. Ehrhart,
(1916) 202 Ill. App. 617 (stock of goods and furniture); Borden v.
Fine, (1912) 212 Mass. 425, 96 N. E. 1073; National Bread Wrapping
Machine Co. v. Crowl, (1926) 137 Wash. 621, 243 Pac. 840 (machinery).
3Littlejohn & Bull, Inc. v. Deutch, (1918) 182 App. Div. 759, 169
N. Y. S. 720 (informal writing); Edward Thompson & Co. v. Hunt,
(1920) 218 Ill. App. 616 (written memoranda conflicting); Skilton v.
R. H. Long Cadillac La Salle Co., (1929) 265 Mass. 595, 164 N. E. 652
(writings conflicting).4 Auburn Shale Brick Co. v. Cowan Bldg. Co., (1915) 125 Md. 221,
93 Atl. 443 (bricks); Klinge v. Farris, (1929) 128 Or. 142, 273 Pac.
954 (foxes).
5For instance, in Fiedler v. Bigelow, (1926) 25 Oh. App. 456, 159
N. E. 131, is presented the question of the application of a statute
requiring a certain type of bill of sale on the transfer of an automobile.
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from the English Statute of Frauds, enacted in the year 1677.8
This statute covered many types of transactions and provided for
different formalities among them. The seventeenth section of
this statute applied to sales of goods. It provided in substance
that if the transaction exceeded ten pounds in value, it should be
unenforceable unless the buyer accepted and actually received a
portion of the goods, or made part payment, or unless a memor-
andum in writing of the bargain was made and signed by the
party to be charged or his agent thereunto lawfully authorized.7
In somewhat varying form, the statute of frauds has been enacted
in the various states of the United States. Some version of the
seventeenth section, applicable to the sale of goods, is in force in
all but a few of our states at the present time." The substance of
the seventeenth section of the original statute of frauds, is now
found in sec. 4 of the Uniform Sales Act. As business processes
and business habits change in adaptation to changing times and
conditions, novel problems regarding its application are constantly
arising.
Sec. 3. CONFLICTING CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING ITS
USEFULNESS
Many conflicting interpretations of the statute and divergent
viewpoints as to the reasons behind the statute have been set forth
in the multitude of resulting decisions on its application, and in
the professional literature of the subject in the course of its long
jiudicial history. 9 It may be readily admitted that the original
statute of frauds at the time of its enactment in the year 1677,
was a piece of wise social engineering to avoid the enforcement
of feigned bargains proved through fraudulent perjured. oral testi-
mony. For instance, at that time witnesses with an interest in the
litigation were disqualified from testifying. Where a defendant
who himself had personal knowledge was thus practically helpless
6For a convenient historical account of the statute of frauds, see
6 Holdsworth, History of English Law, 379-397.7The exact wording is conveniently accessible in quotation in 1
Williston, Sales, 2nd ed., sec. 51.
81 Williston, Sales, 2nd ed., sec. 51 lists the following states as
having no statutory provision corresponding to sec. 17 of the original
Statute of Frauds: Alabama, Delaware, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
New Mexico, North Carolina, Texas, Virginia and West Virginia.
From this list Kentucky must now be omitted, however, as it has now
adopted the Uniform Sales Act.9Some of these are discussed briefly in 6 Holdsworth, History of
English Law, 387-397.
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to disprove perjured testimony against him, requiring a writing
signed by the party to be charged as a guaranty of genuineness
of the claim asserted against him seems but the protection properly
due to otherwise helpless innocent defendants.' 0 Today, with the
interest disqualification of witnesses removed, the need originally
served by the statute in this regard has disappeared. The spec-
tacle now repeatedly observed in legitimate cases, of an appar-
ently fraudulent defendant sliding out of a genuine bargain on the
merely technical defense of the lack of the statutory writing has
led to much questioning as to whether the statute of frauds now
serves a useful purpose.' Divergent viewpoints as to the wisdom
of the statute under present conditions undoubtedly accounts for
some of the conflicting broderline decisions as to its present appli-
cations.1" It must not be overlooked, however, that while some
of the original reasons for enacting the statute of frauds have
disappeared, other reasons for continuing it in force have been
becoming apparent. The statute serves a useful purpose in so far
as it contributes to the business habit of requiring a writing. The
lay tradition, often encountered, that a writing signed by the
party must be had to make a contract binding probably is to a
certain extent derived from the statute of frauds." Not only is
a writing useful to prevent fraud by deliberate overreaching re-
garding the terms of the bargain, but the presence of a writing pre-
vents to a large extent otherwise possible innocent misunderstand-
ing of what actually were the terms of the bargain. It also pre-
106 Holdsworth, History of English Law, 388-390.
116 Holdsworth, History of English Law, 396; Stephen and Pollock,
Section Seventeen of the Statute of Frauds, (1885) 1 L. Quart. Rev. 1;
Burdick, A Statute for Promoting Fraud, (1916) 16 Col. L. Rev. 273;
Willis, The Statute of Frauds-A Legal Anachronism, (1928) 3 Ind.
L. J. 427 and 528.
1See, for instance, the favorable attitude toward the statute, taken
in Upton Mill, etc., Co. v. Baldwin Flour Mills, (1920) 147 Minn. 205,
179 N. W. 904 (flour) and Dolan Mercantile Co. v. Marcus, (1923)
276 Pa. St. 404, 120 Atl. 396 (sugar), as contrasted with the critical
attitude toward the statute shown in Chas. R. Ablett Co. v. Sencer,
(1927) 130 Misc. Rep. 416, 224 N. Y. S. 251 (electric bulbs).
Such is the background, too, for the ever recurring assertion that
the statute of frauds was enacted to prevent fraud, not to aid it, and
should receive a reasonable construction directed to that end. For a
recent case invoking that viewpoint as a guide in the particular problem
see Mead v. Leo Sheep Co., (1925) 32 Wyo. 313, 232 Pac. 511.
On the other hand, it was held in Steiner v. Am. Alcohol Co.,
(1918) 181 App. Div. 309, 168 N. Y. S. 739 that one party's fraudulent
prevention of the giving of the memorandum did not dispense with its
necessity under the statute, as the statute would be nullified by hold-
ing it inapplicable where the memorandum was withheld through fraud
13Llewellyn, Cases and Materials on Sales 917.
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serves the exact wording of the terms, rather than leaving them to
the recollection of their general purport preserved in the elusive
and treacherous memory of interested parties. 4 With present day
long time contracts, often negotiated for large amounts in dealings
at the last moment closed in a telephone conversation or in an
order given orally to a traveling salesman, it is highly important
to have the written "confirmation" in due course at the outset
to ascertain that the parties have correctly understood each other,
instead of finding out about the difficulty, if any, only after the
lapse of weeks or months after all commitments have been made.
In this viewpoint, the cases that justify the statute are not pri-
marily the litigated cases themselves, where it often looks as if a
tricky defendant slides out of an honest bargain on the mere
technicality of the lack of the statutory writing. The cases that
justify the statute are rather the thousands of uncontested current
transactions where misunderstanding and controversy are avoided
by the presence of a writing which the statute at least indirectly
aided to procure.'5 While reasons of this sort are not frequently
14 Llewellyn, -Cases and Materials on Sales 916. See also Mayer v.
Hirsch, (1918) 212 Ill. App. 441, 444.
'
5The fact foundation assumed by this reasoning that the statute
has increased the use of written memoranda, is sharply questioned in
Stephen and Pollock, Section Seventeen of the Statute of Frauds, (1885)
1 L. Quart. Rev. 6-7, as follows: ". . . the power of law to control
conduct is small, and is constantly exaggerated. ... Custom, and what
is called common sense, regulate the great mass of human transactions.
• .. If you require people to take precautions which they feel to be
practically unnecessary . . . they will prefer the risk of the penalties
of neglect to the nuisance of taking the precaution. . . . To buy and
sell is the daily and hourly business of a large part of the population;
and it is perfectly certain that they will make their contracts in the
manner which they find convenient, and not in the manner which
lawyers prescribe for them .... immense numbers of the class of con-
tracts to which that enactment applies are made with no reference at
all to its provisions."
The opposing viewpoint, sustaining the usefulness of the statute
under present conditions, is persuasively phrased in Llewellyn, Cases
and Materials on Sales 916-17, as follows: "Along these lines, then,
it may be argued that transactions-and especially transactions looking
to the future-would do well to be in writing, and that a rule which
presses in that direction presses well. That a good part of the lay
feeling in many quarters that a deal is no deal until it is signed up,
is healthy; some of it must be traceable indirectly to the statute. That
the statute's influence in keeping untold monbers of disputes fromf aris-
ing, by getting what might otherwise be oral deals onto paper, is
worth its cost in pinching some unfortunates from 'time to time.
And, the argument would proceed, the costs are constantly decreas-
ing. They decrease-with spreading literacy. They decrease as particu-
lar trades which have to deal quickly become organized and learn how
to meet the statute with a few pencil scratches-the stockbroker's
exchange of "bought and sold notes." They decrease especially as busi-
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discussed at length in the decided cases, their actual presence in
this field largely explains the readiness with which the business
world seems to assume that on the whole the statute of frauds as
applied to sales of goods is doing more good than harm, and in
consequence does not press for its repeal despite the pungent
criticisms occasionally in recent times directed against it.16 Rea-
sons such as these, moreover, may properly claim the attention of
courts when novel doubtful borderline questions of application of
the statute are presented for solution; cases where a literal con-
struction may destroy while a more liberal construction may save
the particular transaction involved.
Sec. 4. EFFECT OF NON-COiPLIANCE
The broadest general question on the application of the statute
of frauds, the question of what is the effect of non-compliance
with the statute, is under the improved wording used in the Uni-
form Sales Act answered without much difficulty. Under the
wording used in the Uniform Sales Act, "shall not be enforce-
able by action," it is readily seen that the transaction is not en-
tirely void without a writng, but is merely unenforceable. 7 This
was the position taken, too, by the large weight of authority under
ness units grow, and written records become necessary for the controi
by executives of what subordinates have done, so that internal as well
as external pressure moves toward the written memorandum. To this
is added the impetus of the standardized contract, conveniently possible
only by way of printed forms. The national market, with its inter-city
deals by mail, is added. And finally, answering from a business man's
point of view the same needs that the statute answers, comes the
almost universal practice of "confirming" by letter the telephone or
face to face conversation-for purposes of record, for purposes of com-
parison, for purposes of authentication. Indeed, this practice of
confirmation alone almost might be enough to justify the statute in
ninety per cent of the field of its operation; it shows that the statute
is in basic accord with practice apart from the statute. If the confirma-
tions do not check, the statute may bar an action; but the parties know
within a day or two how matters stand; which is a vastly different
thing from uncovering a dispute three months later, with all commit-
ments made."
"'See the critical references cited in note 11 above.
17 Edwards Mfg. Co. v. Bradford Co., (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1923) 294 Fed.
176 (sheet steel) ; West v. Kenney, (1920) 220 Ill. App. 49 (corn);
Webster v. Condon, (1924) 248 Mass. 269, 142 N. E. 777 (oats) ; Madda-
loni Olive Oil Co. v. Aquino, (1920) 191 App. Div. 31, 180 N. Y. S. 724
(wine) ; Webster-Tapper Co. v. Eastern Hay Co., (1916) 39 R. I. 482,
998 Atl. 50 (oats); Steiner v. Am. Alcohol Co., (1918) 181 App. Div.
309, 168 N. Y. S. 739 (contract held unenforceable for lack of a writing
even though the defendant's fraud caused the omission of the writing);
Abraham v. Durward, (1920) 46 N. D. 611, 180 N. W. 783 (potatoes).
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the divergent wordings found in the earlier versions of the statute
of frauds, though there was much conflict of opinion.18 Accord-
ingly, it is now readily seen that a memorandum made subse-
quently to the transaction and acknowledging its terms makes the
transaction enforceable.' 9 The contract is enforceable against a
defendant who has signed the memorandum, though not enforce-
able against the other party who has not signed.20  The defense of
lack of compliance with the statute can ordinarily not be set up by
third persons not parties to the contract.21 It is commonly held,
though there are also contrary decisions, that the defense of the
statute of frauds must be affirmatively pleaded, and cannot be
taken advantage of under a general denial.2 2  It is often said,
again, though on this point there is great diversity of opinion,
that the statute of frauds affects the remedy only, rather than the
'
8See 1 Williston, Sales, 2nd ed., sec. 71a and 72a for a compilation of
authorities.
19Spiegel v. Lowenstein, (1914) 162 App. Div. 443, 147 N. Y. S. 655
(copper wire). The same position, that subsequent satisfaction of the
statute renders the previously unenforceable contract now enforceable, has
been upheld with respect to part payment as satisfaction of the statute.
See Gordon v. Witty, (1921) 198 App. Div. 333, 190 N. Y. S. 381, and
Widmeyer v. Crane, (1923) 121 Misc. Rep. 309, 200 N. Y. S. 875.20Bache v. Bankograph Co., (1922) 120 Misc. Rep. 44, 197 N. Y. S.
663 (foreign money).21Edwards Mfg. Co. v. Bradford Co., (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1923) 294 Fed.
176 (oral resale contract by a buyer available as measure of damages in
action against the buyer's defaulting seller) ; Wilton Mfg. Co. v. Machin-
ery, etc., Sales Co., (1919) 187 App. Div. 523, 174 N. Y. S. 766 (defense
that the debtor's obligation was not in writing not available to the
guarantor).
The position stated in the text is not always carried out consistently.
Thus in Kent -Costikyan Trading Co. v. Am. Ry. Express Co., (1925) 124
Misc. Rep. 510, 208 N. Y. S. 445 it was stated by way of dictum that a
carrier of goods, sued by the buyer for damage to goods in transit, could
set up against the buyer the defense that the title had not passed under
the statute of frauds. That position seems indefensible.
"2Pearlberg v. Levisohn, (1920) 112 Misc. Rep. 95, 182 N. Y. S. 615
(clothing); Coff-Garrod Co. v. Norman Chocolate Co., (App. Div. 1921)
185 N. Y. S. 553 (chocolate); Taubin v. Manowitz, (App. Div. 1921)
187 N. Y. S. 174; Widmeyer v. Crane, (1923) 121 Misc. Rep. 309, 200
N. Y. S. 875 (corporate stock); Bernhan Chemical & Metal Corp. v.
Ship-A-Hoy, Ltd., (1922) 200 App. Div. 399, 193 N. Y. S. 372 (corn
sugar chips); Abraham v. Durward, (1920) 46 N. D. 611, 180 N. W. 783
(potatoes).
Contra: Mason-Heflin Coal Co. v. Currie, (1921) 270 Pa. St. 221,
113 AtI. 202 (coal) ; American Products Co. v. Franklin Quality Refining
Co. (1923) 275 Pa. St. 332, 119 Atl. 414 (oil); Franklin Sugar Refining
Co. v. Eiseman, (1927) 290 Pa. St. 486, 139 Atl. 147 (sugar). Substan-
tially similar to the Pennsylvania position is Quinn-Shepardson Co. v.
Triumph Farmers' Elevator Co., (1921) 149 Minn. 24, 182 N. W. 710
(oats), decided after the adoption of the Uniform Sales Act in Minnesota
but without in the instance making any reference thereto.
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right under the contract, and is to be dealt with as procedural
matter, governed by the law of the forum, rather than as a sub-
stantive matter governed by the law of the place of making of
the contract.23 The fact that a party has on previous occasions
performed oral contracts which were unenforceable does not,
however, preclude his setting up the statute of frauds as a defense
under a subsequent contract.2 4 It is usually held, too, that modi-
fications of contracts to which the statute is applicable, to be en-
forceable, must themselves comply with the statute.
25 Parol rescis-
23Straesser-Arnold Co. v. Franklin Sugar Refining Co., (C.C.A. 7th Cir.
1925) 8 F. (2d) 601 (sugar); Franklin Sugar Refining Co. v. Lipowicz,
(1927) 220 App. Div. 160, 221 N. Y. S. 11 (sugar). It has been held in
Pennsylvania, however, that the statute of frauds embodied in the Uniform
Sales Act affects the right under the contract rather than the remedy only.
See the Pennsylvania cases in note 22 above. In Manufacturer's Light &
Heat Co. v. Lamp, (1921) 269 Pa. St. 517, 520, 112 Atl. 679, 681, Sadler,
J. said: "Statutes such as the one with which we are dealing, do not
provide mere rules of evidence but are limitations upon the judicial author-
ity to afford remedies." Accordingly, it has been held to follow that the
law of the place of making of the oral contract recognizing no right, an
oral Pennsylvania contract obnoxious to the statute there was unenforce-
able everywhere, even though the law of the forum did not require a
writing. See Franklin Sugar Refining Co. v. Martin-Nelly Grocery Co.,
(1923) 94 W. Va. 504, 119 S. E. 473 (sugar); Franklin Sugar Refining
Co. v. Holstein Harvery's Sons, Inc., (D.C. Del. 1921) 275 Fed. 622
(sugar); Franklin Sugar Refining Co. v. William D. Mullen Co., (D.C.
Del. 1925) 7 F. (2nd) 470 (sugar). The matter is too complicated to be
here analysed on its merits. For such analytical discussion see 1 Williston,
Sales, 2nd ed., sec. 126, and Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 173-177; McClin-
tock, Distinguishing Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws,
(1930) 78 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 933.
24Webster v. Condon, (1924) 248 Mass. 269, 142 N. E. 777 (oats)
Webster-Tapper Co. v. Eastern Hay Co., (1916) 39 R. I. 482, 98 Atl. 50
(oats).2 5Stead v. Dawber, (1839) 10 Adol. & E. 57 (bones) ; Morris v.
Barton, (1918) A. C. 1; Warren v. A. B. Mayer Mfg. Co., (1901) 161 Mo.
112, 61 S. W. 644 (iron); Maddaloni Olive Oil Co. v. Aquino, (1920)
191 App. Div. 51, 180 N. Y. S. 724 (wine) ; W. J. Crouch Co. v. Farrell,
(App. Div. 1920) 184 N. Y. S. 564. Loose expressions the other way are
at times met with, attempting to draw a questionable distinction between
a new contract and mere modification affecting the performance of an
existing contract. See, for instance, Brouis v. Grafton Light & Power" 'Co.,
(App. Div. 1916) 156 N. Y. S. 1106 (trucks). The leading case for this
view is Cummings v. Arnold, (1842) 3 Metc. (Mass.) 486. Criticising
this distinction, see the concurring opinion of Cardozo, J. in Imperator
Realty Co. v. Tull, (1920) 228 N. Y. 447, 127 N. E. 263. See also 1
Williston, Sales, 2nd ed., secs. 120-122 incl. In Producer's Coke Co. v.
Hoover, (1920) 268 Pa. St. 104, 110 Atl. 733 a written contract to sell
coke was subsequently modified by a parol, and deliveries and payments
under the contract as thus modified were made. It was held that the con-
tract as modified was enforceable not because of any writing but because
there had been acceptance and receipt, and payment. In Van Inderstine
Co. v. Barnet Leather Co. Inc., (1926) 242 N. Y. 425, 152 N. E. 250, 46
A. L. R. 858 it was held that a subsequent oral agreement with reference
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sions of the contract are operative, however, where such cases do
not involve any enforcement 'but merely the abandonment of the
bargain.26 It has also been held that where a party for his own
benefit secures a parol modification of the conditions upon which
his promise is to mature, he is precluded from insisting on the
original written conditions if the other party materially changes
his position in reliance on the parol modification..2 7 This is but an
application of the broad general rule that he who prevents the
happening of a condition is not permitted to take advantage of
the failure of condition which he himself brought about.
Sec. 5. SUBJECT MATTER WITHIN THE STATUTE
The application of the statute of frauds to the multitudinous
and varying facts involved in practical business transactions has
very naturally led to some sharply contested distinctions in border-
line cases where it becomes arguable whether the situation involved
is within the statute.
a. Borderline Between Land and Goods.-Borderline ques-
tions as between land and goods under the older statute of frauds
legislation frequently had to be determined, and, many of them
are now relatively well settled although novel applications may
still give rise to controversy. Thus it is commonly held that con-
tracts to sell standing timber2 8 or buildings29, being contracts af-
fecting part of the realty, must comply with that part of the statute
of frauds applying to contracts for transfers of an interest in land.
to the time for delivery while not superseding the written contract which
specified only when deliveries should begin, was evidential as practical con-
struction by the parties as to what was a reasonable time for performance
within the terms of the contract.
NMaddaloni Olive Oil Co. v. Aquino, (1920) 191 App. Div. 51, 180
N. Y. S. 724. See for collected earlier authorities of general application,
1 Williston, Sales, 2nd ed., sec. 119. In Noble v. Ward, (1867) L R. 2
Exch. 135 it was held that a parol unenforceable modification of an exist-
ing written contract did not operate as a rescission of the written con-
tract, the parties not -having intended a rescission of the original con-
tract, except on condition that -the substituted modification be operative
according to their intentions. The modification failing, for lack of a
writing, the obligation under the original contract was therefore held to
remain.27National Importing-& Trading Co. v. 1. A. Bear & Co., (1927) 324
Ill. 346, 155 N. E. 343 (egg albumen); A. Sidney Davison Coal Co. v.
Weston Dodson & Co., (1924) 209 App. Div. 514, 205 N. Y. S. 49 (coal) I
Teuscher v. Utah-Idaho Flour & Grain Co., (1923) 63 Utah 76, 221 Pac.
1096 (alfalfa).28Schaap v. Wolf, (1921) 173 Wis. 351, 181 N. W. 214; Green v.
Armstrong, (1845) 1 Denio (N.Y.) 550.29Lavery v. Pursell, (1888) L. R. 39 Ch. Div. 508, 57 L. J. Ch. 570.
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On the other hand, contracts contemplating the immediate sever-
ance of such materials from the realty, and their sale and removal
as chattels, are held to fall within the section of the statute of
frauds applicable to the sale of goods.30 On a somewhat similar
basis, too, contracts for ordinary industrial growing crops,3' ice33
or natural gas, 3 are commonly classified as falling within the sec-
tion applicable to the sale of goods. Even after this general rule
for dealing with the borderline cases between realty and person-
alty. has been established, close questions of construction of the
agreement as affecting its classification one way or the other may
frequently arise as variant and novel fact situations are encoun-
tered in the development and expansion of the practical business
affairs out of which the contracts arise.3 4
b. Borderline Between Goods and Work and Labor.-The bor-
derline cases between contracts for the sale of goods and con-
tracts for work and labor gave rise under the earlier statute of
frauds legislation to several conflicting rules, prevalent in differ-
ent jurisdictions, as to the application of the statute of frauds
thereto. Thus the English rule was finally established in Lee v.
Griffin,3 a case involving a contract for the manufacture of a
set of false teeth to the defendant's order. This case held that if
the contract iq intended to result in transferring a chattel for a
price it is a contract for the sale of a chattel, notwithstanding
that the chattel is not in existence at the time of the contract,
and is to be the product of the labor and materials of the seller.
This rule has had some following in this country. The New York
"°Robbins v. Farwell, (1899) 193 Pa. St. 37, 44 Atl. 260 (trees);
Marshall v. Green, (1875) L. R. 1 C. P. Div. 35 (trees); Wetkopsky v.
New Haven Gas Light Co., (1914) 88 Conn. 1, 90 Atl. 30 (building).
There was much American authority contra, with respect to standing
timber, before the adoption of the Uniform Sales Act. One of the leading
cases illustrating that position is Hirth v. Graham, (1893) 50 Oh. St. 57,
33 N. E. 90, 19 L. R. A. 721. The authorities on the point are compiled
in 1 Williston, Sales, 2nd ed., sec. 62.
31Stern v. Crawford, (1919) 133 Md. 579, 105 Atl. 780 (wheat);
Wenger v. Grummel, (1920) 136 Md. 80, 110 Atl. 206 (tomatoes); Evans
v. Roberts, (1826) 5 Barn. & C. 829, (potatoes); Sainsbury v. Matthews,
(1838) 4 M. & W. 343 (potatoes).
32Higgins v. Kusterer, (1879) 41 Mich. 318, 2 N. W. 13.
s3 Manufacturer's Light & Heat Co. v. Lamp, (1921) 269 Pa. St.
517, 112 At. 679.
3 Vulicevich v. Skinner, (1888) 77 Cal. 239, 19 Pac. 424 (growing
peaches, though produced on permanent trees, dealt with on the analogy of
crops); Whitmarsh v. Walker, (1840) 1 Metc. (Mass.) 313 (nursery
trees dealt with on the analogy of crops).
3°(1861) 1 Best & Smith 272.
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rule, in the formulation of which the cases of Parsons v. Loucks,36
and Cooke v. Millard 7 are leading cases, holds that an agreement
to sell a commodity not in existence but which the seller is to
manufacture and put in condition to be delivered is not a con-
tract to sell but is to be dealt with as a contract for work and labor,
and that where the chattel is in existence the contract is to be
deemed a contract to sell even though the article may have been
ordered from a seller who is to do some work upon it to adapt it
to the requirements of the purchaser. The so-called New York
rule had a considerable following in this country before the Uni-
form Sales Act, 8 a following which is now being reduced by
progressive adoption of the Uniform Sales Act in more and more
jurisdictions. The Massachusetts rule, formulated in the leading
cases of Mixer v. Howarth0 and Goddard v. Binney,40 is the rule
now adopted in sec. 4 (2) of the Uniform Sales Act, which
seemed to represent the weight of American authority before the
statute.41 The draftsman of the Uniform Sales Act has explained
that although the English rule is more exact from a scientific
standpoint, as a practical rule, it seems to have no advantage over
the Massachusetts rule.42 Under the Uniform Sales Act, accord-
ingly, not only are the contracts within the statute where the goods
are to be specially manufactured by a third person for the seller
and when manufactured sold by the seller to tl~e buyer,43 but
the contracts are also within the statute where the goods are to be
manufactured by the seller especially for the buyer unless the
goods are not suitable for sale to others in the ordinary course
of the seller's business.44 Naturally, in the application of this
36(1871) 48 N. Y. 17 (paper to be manufactured).
37(1875) 65 N. Y. 352, 22 Am. Rep. 619 (existing lumber to be dressed
for the purchaser).38The authorities are gathered in 1 Williston, Sales, 2nd ed., sec. 55.
39(1839) 21 Pick. (Mass.) 205 (contract to make and sell a buggy).
40(1874) 115 Mass. 450 (contract to make and sell a buggy).41Authorities are set out in 1 Williston, Sales, 2nd ed., sec. 55.
421 Williston, Sales, 2nd ed., sec. 55a.43Atlas Shoe Co. v. Rosenthal,. (1922) 242 Mass. 15, 136 N. E. 107
(shoes); Pope v. Brooks, (1924) 249 Mass. 381, 144 N. E. 214 (rugs).44Uniform Sales Act. sec. 4 (2); Goldowitz v. Henry Kupfer & Co.,
(1913) 80 Misc. Rep. 487, 141 N. Y. S. 531; Pearlberg v. Levisohn,
(1920) 112 Misc. Rep. 95, 182 N. Y. S. 615 (clothing to be manufactured) ;
Berman Stores Co. v. Hirsch, (1925) 241 N. Y. 209, 148 N. E. 212
(clothing to be manufactured). Where the contract with the buyer pro-
vides merely that the goods are to be supplied by the seller, leaving the
seller free to buy them elsewhere if convenient, instead of himself manu-
facturing them to fill the buyer's order, the statute of course applies, the
special exception mentioned in the last part of sec. 4 (2) not touching
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section of the Uniform Sales Act to current transactions, the
suitability of the goods for sale to others in the ordinary course
of the seller's business has at times been carefully examined as a
fact question 45 for help in the solution of which some subsidiary
rules are sometimes suggested. 46
c. Borderline Between Goods and Choses in Action.-Border-
line questions as between goods and choses in action under the
original statute of frauds legislation gave rise to great conflict of
authority. The English cases generally held that choses in action
were outside the range of the statute, not being goods, wares,
those facts. Eagle Paper Box Co. v. Gatti-McQuade Co., (1917) 99
Misc. Rep. 508, 164 N. Y. S. 201 (chip board); Funt v. Schiffman, (1921)
115 Misc. Rep. 155, 187 N. Y. S. 666 (coats) ; Brody v. Schondorf, (App:
Div. 1921) 187 N. Y. S. 672 (coats).
45Roth Shoe Co. v. Zager, (1923) 195 Iowa 1238, 193 N. W. 54j
(shoes made to defendant's special order, of odd sizes and widths anct
stamped with defendant's name, within the exception); Adams v. Cohen.
(1922) 242 Mass. 17, 136 N. E. 183 (whether shoes manufactured according
to a special order were suitable for sale in the general market held a
question of fact for the jury); Brooks v. Stone, (1826) 256 Mass. 16
152 N. E. 59 (carpets specially cut and sewed to fit the floor dimensions
of defendant's office within the exception); M. K. Smith Corp. v. Ellis,
(1926) 257 Mass. 269, 153 N. E. 548 (cider tank built according to defen-
dant's special order within the exception) ; Ericsson Mfg. Co. v. Caille
Bros. Co., (1917) 195 Mich. 545, 162 N. W. 81 (ignition magnetos speciall
made for defendant's use with his type of motor within the exception)
Davis v. Blanchard, (App. Div. 1912) 138 N. Y. S. 202 (suit made to
defendant's measure by plaintiff tailor within the exception); Schneider
v. Lezinsky, (App. Div. 1917) 162 N. Y. S. 769 (suits made for defendant
out of a special type of cloth not handled in plaintiff's business within the
exception).
40Goods of standard type in the plaintiff's business are not within the
exception though manufactured on defendant's special order. Saco-Lowell
Shops v. Clinton Mills Co., (C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1921) 277 Fed. 349 (cotton
mill machinery); Zimmerman v. Gillman, (App. Div. 1918) 172 N. Y. S.
262 (men's suits); Joseph Galin Co. v. Newhouse, (1920) 110 Misc. Rep.
686, 180 N. Y. S. 812 (men's suits) ; Berman Stores Co. v. Hirsch, (1925)
240 N. Y. 209, 148 N. E. 212 (men's suits of the usual sizes and models).
Goods manufactured on defendant's special order are not within the excep-
tion where slight alterations will render them salable to others in the
ordinary course of the seller's business. Clinton Mills Co. v. Saco-Lowell
Shops, (C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1925) 3 F. (2nd) 410 (cotton mill machinery);
Bauer v. Victory Catering Co., (1925) 101 N. J. Eq. 364, 128 Atl. 262
(silverware with buyer's initial and crest stamped thereon, but removable
by the expenditure of about one-tenth of the resale value) ; Berman Stores
Co. v. Hirsch, (1925) 240 N. Y. 209, 148 N. E. 212 (men's suits of usual
sizes and models manufactured on defendant's order, with defendant's labels
attached, which were, however, easily removable). The burden of proof
with respect to the transaction's being within this special exception is upon
the party claiming the benefit of the exception. Reading Silk Mills v.
Barso, (App. Div. 1918) 169 N. Y. S. 672 (silk cloth in certain color
patterns); Zimmerman v. Gillman, (App. Div. 1918) 172 N. Y. S. 262
(men's clothing).
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and merchandise.4 7 American cases, noting that the need of a
writing in cases of transfers of choses in action may be as great as
in cases of sales of goods, often applied the statute to cases involv-
ing what is called specialty choses in action, such as share certifi-
cates of corporate stock, bonds, mortgages, and negotiable paper.48
Such instances afforded a technical reason at least for applying
the statute, involving as they did not only a transfer of an intang-
ible chose in action but also a transfer of the tangible paper, itself
a chattel, in which the chose in action was embodied. In some
states the statutory wording was broad enough expressly to cover
choses in action.49 In the Uniform Sales Act, the wording of the
statute in this respect was so broadly drawn as expressly to include
broadly not only chattels but also choses in action generally.50 The
borderline questions in this respect are therefore removed under
the Uniform Sales Act, since its application broadly to transfers
of choses in action in general no longer makes it necessary to in-
voke the technical inquiry of finding a chattel element involved in
specialty choses in action.51
47Humble v. Mitchell, (1839) 11 A. & E. 205 (1839) (certificate for
share of corporate stock) ; Colonial Bank v. Whinney, (1885) L. R. 30
Ch. Div. 261, 283 (choses in action generally).
48The authorities are gathered in 1 Williston, Sales, 2nd ed., sec. 67.49See for instance Artcher v. Zeh, (1843) 5 Hill (N.Y.) 200; Spear
v. Bach, (1892) 82 Wis. 192, 52 N. W. 97.
50".. . any goods or choses in action .. ." Uniform Sales Act, sec.
4 (1).
51With the large expansion of corporate dealings in recent times, sales
transactions involving corporate stock have frequently been held to fall
within the statute of frauds provision of the Uniform Sales Act where
share certificates were involved. De Nunzio v. De Nunzio, (1916) 90
Conn. 342, 97 Atl. 323; Armstrong v. Orler, (1915) 220 Mass. 112, 107
N. E. 392; Wood v. Fairbanks, (1923) 244 Mass. 10, 137 N. E. 924;
Melniker v. Winter, (1929) 105 N. J. L 278, 145 Atl. 318; Kellner v.
Kener, (1918) 104 Misc.-Rep. 254, 171 N. Y. S. 814; Davis Laundry &
Cleaning Co. v. Whitmore, (1915) 92 Oh. St. 44, 110 N. E. 518; Wooley
v. Loose, (1920) 57 Utah 336, 194 Pac. 908, 14 A. L. R. 372; Becker v.
Kreul, (1921) 173 Wis. 273, 181 N. W. 211; Pierce v. Rothwell, (1928)
38 Wyo. 267, 267 Pac. 86. Under the Uniform Sales Act, however, the
statute is equally applicable to cases where no certificates had been issued
but the deal was for a transfer of the shareholders' interest. Illinois-
Indiana Fair Ass'n v. Phillips, (1927) 328 Ill. 368, 159 N. B. 815 (oral
agreement to buy certain shares that had been subscribed for, but for
which certificates had not yet been issued); Davis v. Arnold, (1929) 267
Mass. 103, 165 N. E. 885 (oral contract to buy from plaintiff an allotment
of shares expected to be issued to him) ; Bohrer v. Auslander, (1929) 133
Misc. Rep. 597, 233 N. Y. S. 182 (fractional interest in shares) ; Mahoney
v. Kennedy, (1920) 172 Wis. 568, 179 N. W. 754 (share certificates still
unissued at the time the transfer was made). For certain possible questions
regarding the constitutionality of this section of the Uniform Sales Act,
which the present text does not attempt to discuss, see Guppy v. Moltrup,
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d. Miscellaneous Novel Borderline Applications.-The chang-
ing detail of current business transactions as new commercial
devices are introduced every now and then raises some variant
or novel aspects of the application of the statute of frauds. Thus
among the grist of relatively recent cases, arising under the Uni-
form Sales Act, it has been held that the statute of frauds provi-
sion applied to a contract to sell foreign money as a commodity.2
The statute has been held not to apply, however, to "an agree-
ment for a transfer of foreign credit by cable," the facts being
understood by the court, in the light of the banking and commer-
cial usage presented, not to involve a sale of an existing credit,
an existing chose in action, but to involve a contract to create in
favor of the party a credit abroad at a future time.5 3 So, while
the statute is applicable to contracts to transfer existing shares of
corporate stock,5 4 existing choses in action, it has been held not
applicable to original subscriptions for corporate stock whereby
such choses in action are in the first instance created when the
original subscriber becomes a member of the corporation.55 Simi-
larly, the statute is not applicable to a contract to pay for corporate
stock if the proper construction of its terms shows that it is not a
contract for the purchase of such stock but is a contract to indem-
nify the other party against loss.56 While the provision of the
statute of frauds applicable to goods does not apply to a contract
for services,57 yet it is applicable to a contract to sell goods though
(1924) 281 Pa. St. 343, 126 Atl. 766; Mason-Heflin Coal Co. v. Currie,
(1921) 270 Pa. St. 221, 113 Atl. 202; Petty v. Phoenix Cotton Oil Co.,
(1924) 150 Tenn. 292, 264 S. W. 353.
62Reisfeld v. Jacobs, (1919) 107 Misc. Rep. 1, 176 N. Y. S. 223.3Equitable Trust Co. v. Keene (1922) 232 N. Y. 290, 133 N. E. 894. In
the lower court, where the facts had been interpreted as amounting to a
contract to transfer existing credits, the statute was held applicable. See
Equitable Trust Co. of N. Y. v. Keene, (1921) 195 App. Div. 384, 186
N. Y. S. 468. The reversal in the higher court was therefore primarily
on the facts. For a study of cable or wireless transfers of credit, in
general, see Fraenkel, Some Aspects of the Law Relating to Foreign
Exchange, (1920) 20 Col. L. Rev. 832.54See footnote 51 above.55Mills v. Friedman, (1920) 111 Misc. Rep. 253, 181 N. Y. S. 285;
Shadbolt & Boyd Iron Co. v. Long, (1920) 172 'Wis. 591, 179 N. W. 785.
The same result was reached under the earlier versions of the statute of
frauds before the Uniform Sales Act. See authorities compiled in 1 Willis-
ton, Sales, 2nd ed., sec. 67, at note 89.
5(Wood v. Fairbanks, (1923) 244 Mass. 10, 137 N. E. 924; Linglebach
v. Luckenback, (1919) 168 Wis. 481, 170 N. W. 711, 4 A. L. R. 380;
Pierce v. Rothwell, (1928) 38 Wyo. 267, 267 Pac. 86. On this point see
also a good discussion in Kunzmann v. Pettey, (1923) 74 Colo. 342, 221
Pac. 888 (not under the Uniform Sales Act).57Brown v. Frederick J. Quimby Co., .(1910) 204 Mass. 206, 90 N. E.586.
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the price was to be paid in services. 58 The statute has been held
to have no application to a contract to transfer a patent, or a right
to take out a patent.5 9 It has been held not to apply to a contract
to form a partnership or to engage in a joint venture, the parties
to the agreement not standing in such cases in the relation of buy-
ers and sellers. 60 For the same reason it does not apply to the
agency of a broker for a customer in purchase of corporate stock.6 '
It has been held to have no application to the case where a seller
sues the buyer on a check given in part payment, the consideration
for the check not failing so long as the seller is ready and willing
to go through with the oral bargain. 62 Auction sales are held to
be within the statute of frauds provision so long as not expressly
excluded therefrom, although the Uniform Sales Act deals spe-
cifically in another section with other aspects of auction sales.63
The statute of frauds provision has'been held applicable to con-
tracts with an individual defendant to sell goods to a corporation
to be formed, the price to be paid by the defendant.64 With'further
development of new features in current business devices additional
novel questions regarding the application of the statute of frauds
are likely to be raised. In the solution of such novel questions, the
attitude to be taken toward the policy of the statute is likely to be
the principal factor, determining as it does whether the statute is
to be given an extensive or a restricted application.
65
58Davis v. Carnegie Steel Co., (C.C.A. 6th cir. 1917) 244 Fed. 931
(smelter slag).59Dalzell v. Dueber Watch Case Mfg. Co., (1893) 149 U. S. 315, 13
Sup. Ct. 886, 37 L. Ed. 749; Obear-Nester Glass Co. v. Lex & Shaw,
(C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1926) 11 F. (2nd) 240. The reason may be briefly stated
in that a patent right is neither a tangible chattel nor a chose in action
against anyone but is rather an exclusive, privilege for the interferen
with which the law affords a remedy. There is also some authority contra.
Thus in Jones v. Reynolds, (1890) 120 N. Y. 213, 24 N. E. 279 the sale
of an unpatented invention was held to be within the statute of frauds.
In the American Law Institute Restatement on Contracts, sec. 196- (tenta-
tive draft no. 4, Feb. 20, 1928) the subject matter within the statute is
defined as a contract to sell or to buy goods or intangible interests. The
broad term intangible interests certainly would include these cases. Isn't
the term intangible interests, however, a great extension of the statute?60Stack v. Roth Bros. Co., (1916) 162 Wis. 281, 156 N. W. 148.6
'Libaire v. Feinstein, (1928) 133 Misc. Rep. 27, 231 N. Y. S. 3.62Murman v. Manning, (1924) 125 Misc. Rep. 830, 211 N. Y. S. 575
(garage business).63Sargent v. Bryan, (1922) 153 Minn. 198, 189 N. W. 935.64R. & L. Co. v. Metz, (1916) 175 App. Div. 276, 160 N. Y. S. 145
(trucks).65Some specific illustrations on how the court's attitude toward the
policy of the statute affects its application to the individual controversy
are referred to in footnote 12 above.
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Sec. 6. THE VALUE Li iT-$500.00 OR UPWARD
The original fixed value limit to which the statute of frauds
was applicable, ten pounds or over, copied in many states as
$50.00, has with repeatedly rising price levels during the last two
hundred and fifty years been making the statute progressively ap-
plicable to smaller and smaller transactions. In recent times, a fifty
dollar deal has often been regarded as so small relatively that
with respect to it the application of the statute of frauds was a
mere nuisance readily susceptible of occasioning more fraud than
it avoided. In the Uniform Sales Act, in recognition of this diffi-
culty, the limit is fixed at $500.00 or over. This more nearly
corresponds to the original value involved in the ten pound limit
set two hundred and fifty years ago, and thus confines the appli-
cation of the statute of frauds ,to transactions of substantial size
where the occasion is more likely to call for deliberation and a
written record of the transaction and where the effects of mis-
understanding for lack of a writing are likely to be more serious.6"
Through the conservativeness and inertia of legislatures in par-
ticular states, however, the original $50.00 limit has in several in-
stances been retained or some other limit substituted instead of
the $500.00 limit found in the draft Uniform Sales Act as recom-
mended by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.6r
Under the older statute of frauds legislation it became well
established that the mere fact that several articles are bought at a
separate price agreed on for each does not necessarily prove that
several contracts existed. If on all the facts appearing it is appar-
ent that the parties intended the whole series of items to consti-
tute one trade, the sum total of all the items is the amount of the
contract with reference to which the application of the statute ig
to be judged.6" This general position, too, seems not to .have
361 Williston, Sales, 2nd ed., sec. 70.
67According to the latest information available here (1930) the limit
fixed in each of the jurisdictions which have adopted the Uniform Sales
Act is as follows: Alaska, $500; Arizona, $500; Connecticut, $100; Hawaii,
$100; Idaho, $500; Illinois, $500; Indiana, $500; Iowa, no limit specified;
Kentucky, $500; Maine, $500; Maryland, $50; Massachusetts, $500; Michi-
gan, $100; Minnesota, $50; Nebraska, $500; Nevada, $500; New Hamp-
shire, $500; New Jersey, $500; New York, $50; North Dakota, $500;
Ohio, $2,500; Oregon, "exceeding" $50; Pennsylvania, $500; Rhode Island,
$500; South Dakota, $500; Tennessee, $500; Utah, $500; Vermont, $50;
Washington, "exceeding" $50; Wisconsin, $50; Wyoming, $50. The new
limit set in the Uniform Sales Act, where enacted, obviously repeals the
preexisting limit under the statute theretofore in force. Eigen v. Rosolin,
(1914) 85 N. J. L. 515, 89 Atl. 923.68Baldey v. Parker, (1823) 2 B. & C. 37; Harman v. Reeve, (1856)
25 L. J. C. R. 257; Weeks v. Crie, (1900) 94 Me. 458, 48 Atl. 107.
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been seriously questioned in the application of the statute of
frauds provision of the Uniform Sales Act. 9
Sec. 7. SATISFACTION OF THE STATUTE BY ACCEPTANCE AND
ACTUAL RECEIPT
The first way mentioned for satisfying the statute is satisfac-
tion by acceptance and receipt. Where the transaction has been so
far performed by the parties that the buyer has accepted and ac-
tually received a portion of the goods involved, there is little dan-
ger of such barefaced fraud as is'found in the assertion of a purely
*perjured and fictitious transaction. There is equally little danger
of misunderstanding and mistake as to the existence of a deal.
Such partial performance by the parties is indicative that there
was some deal, though it does not indicate what were its terms.
Such partial performance therefore is not as effective protection
against possible imposition as is a signed memorandum showing
the terms. On the other hand, the danger of injustice to the plain-
tiff if the deal is upset for lack of a writing is much greater, while
the danger of injustice to the defendant from being held to an
oral bargain is much less than in the cases where there has been
no such part performance." In apparent recognition of this prac-
tical problem, accordingly, the original statute of frauds itself
provided that it might be satisfied as to transactions involving sales
of goods not only by the making of a written memorandum signed
by the party to be charged but also by the buyer's accepting and
actually receiving a part of the goods involved. This provision,
with a clarifying clause as to its application, is continued in the
Uniform Sales Act.7'
Controversy over the application of this portion of the statute
to the practical details in the handling of business affairs has cov-
ered a wide range as the actual practices in vogue have developed
and gradually changed in the two centuries and a half that have
intervened since the original statute was enacted. Many of the
lessons from this long course of application are summarized in
the leading treatises on the law of sales that have been prepared
for the use of the legal profession during the past generation or
80The annotations to the Uniform Sales Act, published currently by
Edward Thompson Co. to date (1930) show no cases having this poi
as the principal or conspicuous matter in controversy.70The substance of these underlying considerations is most persuasively
indicated in Llewellyn, Cases and Materials on Sales 917-18.71Uniform Sales Act, sec. 4. subdivisions (1) and (3).
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two.72  No attempt is made in this text to repeat them at length.
As business practices have been changing, however, there has
been a gradual shift of emphasis as to the points of application to
the facts over which there now occur active and sharp differences
of opinion. Enough of such litigated points of application have
already accumulated under the Uniform Sales Act to make a sur-
vey of this material itself, with occasional reference to older lead-
ing cases, a fairly representative as well as up to date presentation
of the general problems at present involved.
The simplest cases directly recognize that the statute is satis-
fied and the oral transaction thereby rendered enforceable when
it is shown as a fact that the buyer accepted and actually received
the goods or a portion thereof. 73 Occasional cases haire directly
emphasized that neither acceptance alone nor receipt alone are
enough, but that it requires the concurrence of both to satisfy the
statute under this provision of its language.7" It is necessary,
moreover, that the buyer accept and receive tnder the contract
sought to be enforced. Acceptance and receipt of goods under
one contract does not render enforceable another contract, if oral,
between the same parties. 75 Whether a particular set of facts pre-
72Reference may be made to Benjamin, Sales, 7th ed., (Bennetts) secs.
138-188 inclusive; Mechem, Sales, secs. 353-403 inclusive; 1 Williston, Sale
2nd ed., secs. 73-96 inclusive.
73Stindt v. Stetson, (D. C. Pa. 1921) 272 Fed. 770 (smelter returns);
Mosher v. Williams, (1923) 25 Ariz. 46, 212 Pac. 498 (building stone);
Boston Lumber Co. v. Pendleton Bros., (1925) 102 Conn. 626, 129 Atl.
782 (lumber); Morris Spirt & Co. v. Prior, (1919) 93 Conn. 639, 107
Atl. 513 (sugar) ; Berman v. Littauer, (1922) 141 Md. 649, 119 Atl. 565
(gloves); Doyle v. Widrig, (1919) 207 Mich. 471, 174 N. W. 118 (automo-
bile) ; Lehigh Stove Mfg. Co. v. Kessler, (N. J. 1926) 135 Ati. 335
(stoves); Win. H. Barkhorn & Co. v. Zinno, (1925) 3 N. J. Misc. Rep.
1145, 130 AtI. 823 (lumber); O'Bannon Corporation v. Llowe, (App. Div.
1917) 165 N. Y. S. 439 (leather goods); Blair & Rolland v. Turner, (App.
Div. 1918) 168 N. Y. S. 660 (lumber); New York Mercantile Trading Co.
v. Prahar, (1919) 187 App. Div. 527, 176 N. Y. S. 179 (cigarette cases) ;
Cotton States Hosiery Mills v. Buchwald, (App. Div. 1922) 194 N. Y. S.
145 (hosiery); Allen & Hall v. Roberts, (1925) 85 Pa. Super. Ct.- 279
(carloads of cantaloupes, potatoes, and peaches).74Chicago Metal Refining Co. v. Jerome Trading Co., (1920) 218 Ill.
App. 333 (cement sacks) ; Houghton & Dutton Co. v. Journal Engraving
Co., (1922) 241 Mass. 541, 135 N. E. 688 (print paper); Black Beauty
Coal Co. v. Cohen, (1929) 267 Mass. 98, 165 N. E. 878 (coal); Vitrol
Mfg. Co. v. Standard Chemical Co., (1927) 291 Pa. St. 85, 139 Atl. 615
(vanadium residue) ; Friedman v. Plous, (1914) 158 Wis. 435, 149 N. W.
218 (furniture and stock in trade of a cleaning and dyeing business);
Roberts, Johnson & Rand v. Machowski, (1920) 171 Wis. 420, 177 N. W.
509 (shoes).75Hearn v. Ruark, (1925) 148 Md. 354, 129 Atl. 366 (tomatoes); S. L.
Munson Co. v. De Vries, (1922) 220 Mich. 53, 189 N. W. 859 (clothing);
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sents a case of several contracts or of one contract with several
items may become a very close question."8 Whether the goods
were accepted and received under one contract or another when
there are several contracts between the same parties may readily
present a contested question of fact for the jury.77 On this basis,
the acceptance and receipt of a sample of goods is insufficient to
render an oral contract enforceable7 8 unless the sample were ac-
cepted and received as a part of the bulk to be supplied under the
contract.7 9 Similarly, the acceptance and receipt of goods under
an oral modification of a written contract renders the oral modifi-
cation enforceable.8 Acceptance and receipt of one.installment
under an oral installment contract renders the entire contract en-
forceable8 l even though the contract be properly classified as a
divisible contract.8 2 If the oral contract to sell includes a promise
Wieser v. Emerman & Baumoehl Co., (App. Div. 1920) 185 N. Y. S.
79 (shellac); Franklin Sugar Refining Co. v. Eiseman, (1927) 290 Pa.
St. 486, 139 Atl. 147 (sugar); Libman v. Fox Pioneer Scrap Iron Co.,
(1921) 175 Wis. 485, 185 N. W. 551 (scrap iron).76A convenient illustration is at hand in the facts of Schwarzenbach
v. Schwartz, (App. Div. 1922) 193 N. Y. S. 573, a case in which there
were two items on orders given, apparently at the same time, with the
buyer accepting performance under one and rejecting it as to the other.
The court held they were separate contracts.77Tirrell v. Anderson, (1923) 244 Mass. 200, 138 N. E. 569 (tacks);
Truesdell v. Michigan R. Co., (1923) 225 Mich. 374, 196 N. W. 334 (rail-
road ties); Bundy v. Voelker, (1920) 145 Minn. 19, 175 N. W. 1000
(cabbage); Goldstein v. Marx, (1917) 181 App. Div. 934, 167 N. Y. S.
1101 (glycerine).78Carter, Macy & Co., Inc. v. Matthews, (1927) 220 App. Div. 679,
222 N. Y. S. 472 (tea); Gold v. Cross, (1914) 146 N. Y. S. 164 (cloth);79Braverman v. Naimark, (App. Div. 1922) 194 N. Y. S. 855; Miller
Bros. Hat Co. v. A. D. Smith Sons Co., (1924) 237 N. Y. 570, 143 N. E.
747 (hats). The last mentioned case emphasizes the point that on disputed
adts it is a jury question whether the sample was received independently
or was received under the contract as part of the bulk contracted for.
80H. W. Paine & Co. v. Manistee Tanning Co., (C.C.A. 6th Cir.) 279,
Fed. 340 (hides); Doyle v. Widrig, (1919) 207 Mich. 471, 174 N. W. 118(automobiles) ; Producers' Coke Co. v. Hoover, (1920) 268 Pa. St. 104,
110 Atl. 733 (coal). If the doubtful doctrine is recognized that a modi-
fication of an earlier contract is not a new contract it folloxvs that accept-
ance and receipt of part before the modification which renders the oral
contract enforceable also applies to the modification, the contract as modified
being held enforceable. Brouis v. Grafton Light & Power Co., (App. Div.
1916) 156 N. Y. S. 1106 (trucks); Meyers v. Kaufman, (1920) 110 Misc.
Rep. 321, 180 N. Y. S. 403 (piece good§).
8lJessup & Moore Paper Co. v. Bryant Paper Co., (1925) 283 Pa. St.
434, 129 Atl. 559 (bleached soda pulp).82Dictum in Jessup & Moore Paper Co. v. Bryant Paper Co., (1925)"
283 P~a. St. 434, 129 Atl. 559 (bleached soda pulp). The explanation is
briefly suggested as applied to the converse case in 1 Williston, Sales, 2nd
ed., sec. 72b in the following language: "As a divisible contract is not
several contracts but a single agreement, neither party can be
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by the seller later to repurchase the identical property at the buy-
er's option, the buyer's acceptance and receipt in the original sale
makes the seller's promise to repurchase enforceable.8 3 Accept-
ance and receipt may be as effectively made by. a nominee or
agent84 as by the buyer personally, provided he has authority to
act for the buyer in this regard .8  Acceptance and receipt needt
not be contemporaneous with the bargain whose oral terms they
render enforceable.8 A few additional general applications are
given in the footnote.
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required to perform part unless the whole is enforceable. Therefore, so
long as there has been no payment of the price or acceptance and actual
receipt of any part of the goods, any oral contract of which a sale or a
contract to sell forms part is unenforceable."8 3Armstrong v. Orler, (1915) 220 Mass. 112, 107 N. E. 392 (corp.
stock); Grotto v. Rachman, (1926) 114 Neb. 284, 207 N. W. 204 (corp.
stock); Melniker v. Winter, (1929) 105 N. J. L. 278, 145 Atl. 318 (corp.
stock; Pierce v. Rothwell, (1928) 38 Wyo. 267, 267 Pac. 86 (corp.
stock). One of the leading authorities on the point, decided before the
Uniform Sales Act was adopted, is Johnston v. Trask, (1889) 116 N. Y.
136, 22 N. E. 377, 5 L. R. A. 630 (bonds). See also, to the same effect,
Williams v. Burgess, (1839) 10 Ad. & El. 499, (mare). Whether the
policy of the statute permits the application of the same doctrine to a
contract which is not to repurchase the identical articles sold but to purchase
other goods from the buyer at his option at some later time is sometimes
sharply disputed. Thus in the case of De Waal v. Jamison, (1917) 176
App. Div. 756, 163 N. Y. S. 1045 the majority opinion declines to extend
the doctrine of acceptance and receipt under the statute so far while the
dissent emphatically asserts the propriety of such application. Unless some
limit can be put to the application of the position asserted by the dissent
it is hard to see, if this dissent should prevail, how there is much left of
the statutory protection against the dangers at which the statute was
aimed, whether viewed from the angle of deliberate fraud and perjury
or from the angle of misunderstanding and mistake with respect to contracts
for the sale of property. A later oral contract to repurchase goods prev-
iously sold and delivered, not being part of the original contract partly
executed, of course is not enforceable under the statute of frauds. Brewster
Lond Lumber Co. v. General Builders Supply Co., (1924) 228 Mich. 559,
200 N. W. 283 (lath).84Houghton & Dutton Co. v. Journal Engraving Co., (1922) 241 Mass.
541, 135 N. E. 688 (acceptance and receipt by a third party subpurchaser
to whom the buyer directed the seller to deliver); Taylor v. Harrington,
(1922) 243 Mass. 210, 137 N. E. 350 (building materials delivered by seller
directly to a third party at buyer's direction); New London Ship &
Engine Co. v. Simpson, (1925) 254 Mass. 76, 149 N. E. 670 (materials
for repair of a vessel delivered at the vessel by the seller at the buyer's
direction) ; Sneider v. Big Horn Milling Co., (1921) 28 Wyo. 40, 200
Pac. 1011 (one partner accepting and receiving on behalf of the partner-
ship.)8 5Friedman v. Pious, (1914) 158 Wis. 435, 149 N. W. 218 (alleged
agent having no authority in instant case).
8GGordon v. Witty, (1921) 198 App. Div. 333, 190 N. Y. S. 381;
Widmeyer v. Crane, (1923) 121 Misc. Rep. 309, 200 N. Y. S. 875 (corp.
stock).8 7Acceptance and receipt of the proceeds of a chose in action renders
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a. What Constitutes Accepta.nce.-The natural meaning of the
term "accept" as used in the statute is readily understood to be an
assent on the part of the buyer to take the indicated goods as
owner.88 Where the goods bargained for are specific goods, such
assent, constituting acceptance of the goods, is found in the fact
of the oral agreement itself at the time the bargain was made.89
If the bargain was not one for specific goods but for the supply
of goods of a certain kind, such assent to take certain specific
goods in performance of the contract must appear by subsequent
words or conduct of the buyer. The most frequent controversies
over such subsequent assent occur with regard to conduct. Thus
it became settled at a relatively early date in statute of frauds liti-
gation that a resale of the goods by the buyer was so unequivocal
an act of ownership that his assent to become owner of the goods
was thereby fully manifested 0 Milder instances of alleged acts
the oral contract for its assignment enforceable. Stindt v. Stetson, (D.C.
Pa. 1921) 272 Fed. 770 (smelter returns). Acceptance and receipt of a
defective portion, waiving defects therein, renders the entire oral contract
enforceable. Lawis A. Crossett Co. v. American Polish Corporation, (1922)
97 Conn. 485, 117 Atl. 415 (shoes). Where a single oral deal contemplates
sale of certain portions in severalty to different parties, acceptance and
receipt of a part *by some may satisfy the statute as to them, but not as
to the others. Kellner v. Kener, (1918) 104 Misc. Rep. 254, 171 N. Y. S.
814 (corp. stock). Acceptance and receipt of a chose in action may be
shown, in the case of a fractional interest in a share of corporate stock,
by the seller's handing a written assignment, at the buyer's request, to the
person holding the share certificate. Bohrer v. Auslander, (1929) 133
Misc. Rep. 597, 233 N. Y. S. 182. Where share certificates of corporate
stock have not been issued it is sometimes held that acceptance and receipt
by the purchasing stockholders from their sellers may appear through
their assuming complete control of the corporate property and managing
the corporate business. Mahoney v. Kennedy, (1920) 172 Wisc. 568, 179
N. W. 754. Contra on substantially identical facts is Wheeler v. Barnes,
(1923) 100 Conn. 57, 122 Atl. 912.88Blackburn, Sales 16; 1 Williston, Sales, 2nd ed., sec. 75.
This position is now specifically embodied in the language of the
Uniform Sales Act, sec. 4 (3).89Sparta Produce Exchange v. Wilson & Co., (1922) 223 Ill. App,
126 (strawberries); Illinois Meat Co. v. American Malt & Grain Co.,
(1923) 229 Ill. App. 311 (motors) ; Harlan v. Carney, (1922) 219 Mich.
539, 189 N. W. 27 (oil); Tonkelson v. Malis, (1922) 119 Misc Rep. 717.
197 N. Y. S. 309 (leather) ; Clegg & Clegg v. Lees, (1924) 82 Pa. Super.
Ct. 584 (yarn).90Chaplin v. Rogers, (1801) 1 East. 192 (hay); Morton v.
Tibbett, (1850) 15 Q. B. 428 (wheat). The same problem recurs nowadays
and is answered in the same way. See Hanson v. Knutson Hardware Co.,
(1924) 182 Wis. 459, 196 N. W. 831 (stock of merchandise in store, buyer
taking control of the store and selling to the public from the stock as in
ordinary course of business). In the recent case of Black Beauty Coal
Co. v. Cohen, (1929) 269 Mass. 98, 165 N. E. 878 it is held that even an
offer to resell by the buyer is evidential, though not conclusive, of acceptance.
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of ownership still give rise to similar questions over their suffi-
ciency to show the buyer's assent to become the owner of those
specific goods. Thus, using a portion of raw material in the manu-
facture of finished product has been held sufficient.9 Taking pos-
session of the goods and removing them to another place has been
held enough. 92  Taking control and management of the corporate
assets has been held evidential of assent to become the owner of
corporate stock.03 Mere retention of possession of the goods after
delivery for an unreasonable time without objection or protest is
usually held to be evidential94 though not conclusive, 95 of such
assent to become the owner of the goods. The buyer's acts of
seasonable inspection, followed by prompt rejection, however, do
not manifest any assent to become the owner of the goods and
hence, under the language adopted in the Uniform Sales Act, do
not constitute acceptance. 96 On the particular point of the effect
of inspection the modern English rule is different, the English
Sale of Goods Act having codified some decisions under the ear-
Since the buyer's only commercial motive for accepting often is to enable
himself to resell it would seem very clear, however, that a mere offer to
resell, if merely a feeler as to the possibilities of resale, can readily be
consistent with no acceptance and be in that respect roughly comparable to
inspection to determine whether the buyer cares to accept.
DIsaacson v. J. L. Blum Co., (App. Div. 1919) 178 N. Y. S. 333
(merchandise part of which was made into hats).92Hance v. Frame, (1926) 141 Wash. 50, 250 Pac. 456 (wood).
03Davis Laundry & Cleaning Co. v. Whitmore, (1915) 92 Oh. St. 44,
110 N. E. 518.94Leibman v. Beck, (App. Div. 1920) 179 N. Y. S. 472 (small package
kept five days before opening, and retained nine more days thereafter
before making objection) ; Backman v. Mendelson, (1922) 120 Misc. Rep.
52, 197 N. Y. S. 672; Strachman v. Levy, (1924) 124 Misc. Rep. 160, 207
N. Y. S. 185 (cloth); Fredonia Seed Co. v. Nathan & Bro., (1924) 83 Pa.
Super. Ct. 374 (seeds kept in possession of buyer for a long time) ; Klein-
Messner Co. Inc. v. Fair Waist & Dress Co., (1926); 217 App. Div. 647,
216 N. Y. S. 174 (goods warehoused for buyer who kept the warehouse
receipt over a year without doing anything about it). It may be stated,
generally, that a dealing with the goods such as to constitute an acceptance,
may take place as effectively with an order bill of lading, which represents
the goods, as with the goods themselves. Currie v. Anderson, (1860) 2
El. & El. 592. There seems to have been little, if any, serious controversy
over this point in recent years.95Karwacki v. Holtsberg, (1923) 144 Md. 98, 124 Atl. 410 (goods found
on examination not to be in conformity with sample, buyer setting them
aside as unsatisfactory but not notifying seller for three weeks).9OKewett Grain & Provision Co. v. Spear, (1923) 222 Mich. 608, 193
N. W. 291 (potatoes); Berkman v. Brower, (1912) 76 Misc. Rep. 508,
135 N. Y. S. 582 (moreen); A. Sidney Davison Coal Co. v. Empire
Brick & Supply Co., (App. Div. 1918) 168 N. Y. S. 534 (coal dust); Wise
v. Mondale, (App. Div. 1919) 177 N. Y. S. 867 (woolen goods); Paw-
Paw Cooperative Ass'n v. Sgarlatta, (1927) 91 Pa. Super. Ct. 436 (grapes).
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lier statute which defined acceptance as meaning any act by the
buyer in relation to the goods which recognizes a pre-existing
contract.9 7 The buyer's mere giving of orders for goods to be
filled, not in itself manifesting assent to become the owner of any
specific chattel, is not in itself conduct constituting acceptance.9"
So, the mere acceptance and receipt by the buyer of some circu-
lar plans and directions for the use of goods bargained for, not
being a part of the goods under the contract, does not show the
necessary assent to constitute acceptance.9 9. It was formerly held
in New York, going beyond the words of the earlier statute, that
the policy of the statute required that satisfaction of the statute in
the absence of a memorandum must be shown by some unequiv-
ocal act and could not be founded on mere words alone.100 The
language of the Uniform Sales Act, section 4 (3) is clear, how-
ever, to the effect that acceptance may be shown either by words
or conduct.' 01 Earlier New York precedents to the contrary are
97Kibble v. Gough, (1878) 38 L. T. R. 204 (barley); Page v. Morgan,
(1885) 15 Q. B. D. 228 (wheat); Taylor v. Smith, [1893] 2 Q. B. 65
(spruce deals). The language of the English Sale of Goods Act, sec. 4
(3), is as follows: "There is an acceptance of goods within the meaning
of this section when the buyer does any act in relation to the goods which
recognizes a preexisting contract of sale whether there be an acceptance
in performance of the contract or not." It may be observed that this
development under the English statute, which has not been followed in
the Uniform Sales Act, constitutes a relaxation from the previous policy
of the Statute of Frauds in favor of more liberally sustaining the enforce-
ability of oral transactions. It limits further than before the application
of the statute for the buyer's protection, by enlarging the range for holding
the statute satisfied.98Ft. Dearborn Coal Co., v. Borderland Coal Sales Co., (C.C.A. 6th
Cir. 1925) 7 F. (2d) 441 (coal); Kline v. Minnesota Cent. Creameries,
(1923) 156 Minn. 6, 193 N. W. 958 (coal).99Stopfel v. Tearney, (1923) 207 App. Div. 118, 201 N. Y. S. 621.
'
00The leading case was Shindler v. Houston, (1848) 1 N. Y. 261, 49
Am. Dec. 316 (lumber). The reason given, that mere words are liable to
be misunderstood and misconstrued, and dwell only in the imperfect
memory of witnesses, obviously suggests a legislative question of policy
as to what the limits of the statute ought to be, rather than an inter-
pretation of the language of the statute as drawn by the legislature, which
in its ordinary meaning might on the proper combination of facts be
satisfied by words alone. The matter neatly illustrates the difficulty of
getting unanimous agreement as to just how far it is wise to extend the
protection of the statute and just where the limits should be even after




"There is an acceptance of goods within the meaning of this sec-
tion when the buyer, either before or after delivery of the goods, expresses
by words or conduct his assent to becoming the owner of those specific
goods." Uniform. Sales Act, sec. 4 (3). In De Nunzio v. De Nunzio,
(1916) 90 Conn. 342, 97 Atl. 32a the .court followed earlier precedents
holding that acceptance could not be manifested by mere words alone,
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therefore no longer applicable in jurisdictions which have adopt-
ed the Uniform Sales Act. The New York courts, too, have rec-
ognized that since the enactment of the Uniform Sales Act in that
state their earlier precedents to the contrary on the point of ac-
ceptance do not apply.10 2
A conditional acceptance is not operative as an acceptance to
satisfy the statute of frauds if the facts on which it was expressly
conditioned do not happen, the assent to become owner being lim-
ited by its own express terms.10 3 Whether this rule is equally ap-
plicable to cases where there is an acceptance induced by a mis-
taken belief as to an essential fact is more doubtful. There have
been several decisions in which such cases have been dealt with as
analogous to conditional acceptances, the condition of the exist-
ence of the supposed facts being implied. 4 Against this view is
the weighty authority of Professor Williston, the master specialist
in the subjects of contracts and sales, the draftsman of the Uni-
form Sales Act, who argues that if the requirements of the statute
have actually been satisfied, the motive which induced the buyer
to satisfy them should not be held to condition such acceptance
but should be held to be immaterial,0 5 a position for which it is
counsel apparently not having pressed on the court's attention the applicable
language of the Uniform Sales Act which is directly contrary.
102Carroll v. Schmolock, (App. Div. 1917) 164 N. Y. S. 415 (discuss-
ing in detail the change wrought by the Uniform Sales Act in the earlier
New York rule); Flanigan v. Waterman, (1922) 117 Misc. Rep. 617, 191
N. Y. S. 646 (potatoes-acceptance shown by buyer's acknowledgment to
bailee, and to outside third parties, that he had bought the goods) ; Gaffers-
Hinman Coal Co. v. Wessel, (1928) 132 Misc. Rep. 907, 230 N. Y. S.
561 (coke-acceptance shown by a phone conversation while goods in
transit). In Gold v. Cross, (City Court N.Y. 1914) 146 N. Y. S. 164 through
obvious error the court followed the earlier local precedents on the point,
inadvertently overlooking the Uniform Sales Act, which apparently had
not been called to the court's attention by counsel in charge of the case.
1*3A. Sidney Davison Coal Co. v. Empire Brick & Supply Co., (App.
Div. 1918) 168 N. Y. S. 534 (coal dust-acceptance of alleged inferior
quality goods expressly conditioned on a large deduction in price).
104Ft. Dearborn Coal Co. v. Borderland Coal Sales Co., (C.C.A. 6th
Cir. 1925) 7 F. (2d) 441 (coal-acceptance, known to be on assumption of
a certain nonexistent quality in the goods held inoperative); Barrett
Mfg. Co. v. Ambrosio, (1916) 90 Conn. 192, 96 Atl. 930 (coal tar-buyer's
acceptance of the goods induced by mistake caused by seller's false repre-
sentation). A similar position had been taken under the earlier form of
the statute. In Rodgers v. Phillips, (1869) 40 N. Y. 519, the.buyer who
had accepted a bill of lading for coal shipped aboard a certain vessel and
had applied for insurance on the cargo was held not bound by the accept-
mce, it appearing that at the time of such acceptance the cargo had
.already been destroyed by the sinking of the vessel.
101 Williston, Sales, 2nd ed., sec. 83.
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also possible to adduce supporting authority.1 6 Paraphrased in
different language, this position would decline to limit the opera-
tive effect of acts satisfying the statute by imposing thereon im-
plied conditions to cover cases of mistake. In perspective, the dif-
ference between these two opposing viewpoints respecting the im-
position of implied conditions is a fresh illustration of divergent
attitudes respecting the policy of the statute, the one leading to
a broad application of the statute, the other restricting more
narrowly the application of the statute to save the enforceability
of the particular transaction.
The acceptance relied upon to satisfy the statute of frauds
must have been by the buyer himself or by someone having author-
ity to act for the buyer in that respect. Such authority may be
proved as in any other application of the law of agency. It
seems now well settled. that a carrier's mere authority to trans-
port on the buyer's behalf does not as such include an authority to
assent 6n behalf of the buyer that the.buyer shall become the
owner of the goods." 7 A little more obscure is the question of
whether the seller himself has capacity to act as the buyer's agent
for the purpose of accepting the goods. There is no question,
apart from the statute of frauds, that the seller may act for the
buyer in making an appropriation of the goods passing the prop-
10 Townsend v. Hargreaves, (1874) 118 Mass. 325 (receipt of a part
of wool sold held to enable seller to enforce the contract for the price
of the whole though the rest may have been destroyed by fire before
receipt of a part) ; Vincent v. Germond, (1814) 11 Johns. (N.Y.) 283
(receipt of part of cattle held to render contract enforceable for entire
purchase price though some had died in the interval. In this case, however,
the buyer knew all the facts at the time he took possession). In Leather
Cloth Co. v. Heironimous (1875) 10 Q. B. 140 a letter written after loss
of goods to which it related was held a sufficient memorandum. Here, too,
however, the buyer had knowledge of all the facts at the time the letter
was written. Supporting this viewpoint is also the closely analogous posi-
tion that if the memorandum satisfies the statute, the intention with which
it was made is immaterial. See below, footnote 155, and accompanying
text.
lO7The reason is aptly stated in 1 Williston, Sales, 2nd ed., sec. 89, as
follows: "The agency of the carrier is to receive and carry goods, not
to decide whether they conform to the contract or offer." Among recent
cases' sustaining this position are the following: Spedding v. Griggs,
Fuller & Co., (1917) 196 Mich. 571, 162 N. W. 956 (apples); Southern
Pines Sales Corp. v. Braddock Lumber Co., (1923) 81 Pa. Super. Ct. 309
(lumber); Dolan Mercantile Co. v. Marcus, 1923) 276 Pa. St. 404, 120
AtI. 396 (sugar) ; Burlington Grocery Co. v. McGreggs, (1923) 97 Vt. 63,
122 Atl. 479 (apples). Though there were occasional older cases the
other way, such as Strong, Whiting & Co. v. Dodds, (1875) 47 Vt. 348,
the strong trend of the older authorities was to the same effect. See Ather-
ton v. Newhall, (1877) 123 Mass. 141, 25 Am. Rep. 47 (leather), and
Rodgers v. Phillips, (1869) 40 N. Y. 519 (coal).
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erty to him in performance of a previous contract, the seller's
act of apropriation to him having been by the buyer authorized in
advance."" The rule is usually stated, however, that the seller can-
not act as the buyer's agent for the purpose of acceptance under
the statute of frauds. The reason, briefly stated, is that if the
seller were recognized as having capacity to accept on behalf of
the buyer, as well as having capacity to receive on behalf of the
buyer, the buyer's statutory protection against feigned claims
could in every case be overcome by the mere verbal assertion of
the seller himself, thEreby rendering the statute substantially nuga-
tory. Accordingly, the seller's mere act of appropriation of the
goods to the buyer, even though in conformity with the buyer's
previous order, does not satisfy the statute of frauds with respect
to acceptance 'by the buyer. 0 9
l0SThis matter is properly dealt with at length in connection with sec.
19 of the Uniform Sales Act.
1091 Williston, Sales, 2nd ed., sec. 81. The cases noted in note 107
above, holding that the seller's delivery of goods to the carrier is not
enough necessarily involve this position, as the seller's delivery of goods
to the carrier can readily be sufficient as an act of appropriation. The
cases cited in note 96 above also bear out this position, since, were the
seller's mere appropriation sufficient, no question of the buyer's manifesting
assent by the fact of inspection would be material. In Wilson v. Lewiston
Mill Co., (1896) 150 N. Y. 314, 44 N. E. 959 the same reasoning is em-
ployed in deciding that the seller cannot act as the buyer's agent for making
the memorandum of a contract within the statute of frauds. That is a
rule of long standing. See Wright v. Dannah, (1809) 2 Camp. 203. There
is some confusion on the point in the cases, however, where no intermediate
carrier is involved. Thus, it was correctly held in Peck v. Abbott &
Fernald Co., (1916) 223 Mass. 423, 111 N. E. 890 that the seller's setting
aside of oats for the buyer in accordance with a previous oral contract, but
after the buyer's repudiation, was insufficient as acceptance by the buyer
within the statute of frauds. In Castle v. Swift, (1918) 132 Md. 631,
104 AtI. 187, however, it was held that the seller's setting aside of eggs
for the buyer in accordance with a previous oral contract (denied by the
buyer) was enough to constitute acceptance on behalf of the buyer. The
court in reaching this position quoted indiscriminately both sec. 48 and
sec. 4 of the Uniform Sales Act, inadvertently overlooking the difference
between acceptance sufficing for a common law appropriation of the prop-
erty to the buyer, dealt with in sec. 48, and acceptance sufficient to satisfy
the Statute of Frauds, dealt with in sec. 4. The difference between these
two is sharply emphasized in Clegg & Clegg v. Lees, (1924) 82 Pa. Super.
Ct. 584 (yarn). In Goodwin v. Mariners Savings Bank, (1923) 99 Conn.
169, 121 Ati. 172 it was held that the buyer of corporate stock under an
oral contract could be the seller's agent for accepting in purchasing in the
open market and then receiving on his account as buyer a portion of the
stock, thereby satisfying the statute as to both acceptance and receipt.
While this is distinguishable from Castle v. Swift, (1918) 132 Md. 631,
104 Atl. 187 where the seller was held the buyer's agent for the purpose
of acceptance, yet it seems equally at variance with the policy of the statute.
Under this application it would seem that the statute affords no protection
to alleged sellers, buyers being in position by words alone in every case
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b. What Constitutes Actual Receipt.-Actual receipt by the
buyer means acquisition of possession by the buyer with the seller's
assent. The borderline questions on its applications are very
largely problems on what constitutes possession. The applications
have been very numerous but only those that have been litigated
under the Uniform Sales Act will be here particularly discussed.
Actual receipt by the buyer in its simplest form occurs when
the seller hands over the article to the buyer who takes control.
Such cases constantly occur in commercial dealings, especially at
retail, but their incidents in this respect are too well understood to
lead to litigated controversy. It may happen, however, that the
goods are at the time of the transaction in the hands of a third
party holding for the seller, such as a warehouseman or other
bailee. In that case no physical handling over is required. All that
is necessary for the buyer to receive the goods is for the bailee to
attorn to the buyer, recognizing him as the party for whom the
goods are held. After such attornment by the bailee to the buyer,
the bailee's possession, which previously inured to the seller and
assured his control over the goods now equally inures to the buyer
and assures his control over the goods. The buyer may then be
roughly described as being in possession through his bailee. From
early times, for the convenience of business, and consistent with
the policy of the statute, such attornment by the bailee to the
buyer has been regarded as sufficient actual receipt to satisfy the
statute of frauds, 11 a position which is reaffirmed by the cases
that have arisen under the Uniform Sales Act."' Where the
buyer is already himself in possession as bailee before the oral
sale transaction is had, as for instance where a grain elevator man
holds grain in storage which he later buys from the depositors who
placed it in storage, a similar result is reached. The buyer being
already in physical possession of the goods, no handing over to
him is practically desirable or possible, but by the agreement of
to establish the alleged contract and to supply the required statutory
acceptance and receipt to make it enforceable, through the mere additional
assertion that it was to be carried out through the buyer's buying for him-
self on the seller's behalf from third parties. The case itself, unfortunately,
cites no authorities and does not advert to the Uniform Sales Act, although
that act was on the statute book in the state where the court sat.
1 0 Bentall v. Burn, (1824) 3 Barn. & Cress., 423 (wine); Farina v.
Home, (1846) 16 Mees. & W. 119 (wine).
"'Flanigan v. Waterman, (1922) 117 Misc. Rep. 617, 191 N. Y. S.
646 (potatoes); Borenco Importing Co. v. Sperber, (1923) 205 App. Div.
417, 199 N. Y. S. 469 (straw braid) ; Selznick v. Holmes Pittsburgh Auto-
mobile Co., (1922) 275 Pa. St. 1, 118 Atl. 553 (automobile).
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purchase there is a change in the character of his possession in
that previously he held as bailee for the depositor but after the
agreement he holds possession not as bailee but in his own right as
owner of the goods. "12 Similarly, where the goods are at the
time of the deal in the seller's possession, the parties may because
of their bulk and weight or for other reasons find it convenient
not to make at the moment a physical change of possession. In
that case they might satisfy the statute as to actual receipt by ar-
ranging that the seller is to hold possession of the goods for the
buyer, constituting thus the seller the buyer's bailee.3" The physi-
cal possession of the goods is not changed, but there is a change
in the character of the possession in that previously the seller held
in his own right as owner, but after the deal he holds as bailee
ll2Edan v. Dudfield, (1841) 1 Q. B. 302; Wilson v. Hotchkiss, (1915)
171 Cal. 617, 154 Pac. 1, L. R. A. 1916F 389 (corporate stock previously
pledged to the buyer); Kenesaw Mill & Elevator Co. v. Aufdenkamp,
(1921) 106 Neb. 246, 183 N. W. 294 (wheat already in storage in buyer's
elevator); Snider v. Thrall, (1883) 56 Wis. 675, 14 N. W. 814 (building
structure already in buyer's possession). The same rule is applied in the
cases under the Uniform Sales Act. See Harlan v. Carney, (1922) 219
Mich. 539, 189 N. W. 27 (oil already stored in buyer's storehouse) ; James
Mack Co., v. Bear River Milling Co., (1924) 63 Utah 565, 227 Pac. 1033,
36 A. L. R. 643 (wheat already stored in buyer's elevator. In some cases
on the point it is insisted that after the oral agreement of purchase the
buyer must somehow manifest the change in the character of the possession.
Dietrick v. Sinnott, (1920) 189 Ia. 1002, 179 N. W. 424 (cattle at the
time in hands of buyer's bailee). In the last cited case the discussion in
the opinion, with the authorities there relied upon, readily demonstrates
that the special New York rule is in substance relied on as dictating this
requirement. This requirement is not warranted by the words of the
statute, however, as said by Professor Williston (1 Williston, Sales, 2nd ed.,
sec. 90), and is either not mentioned or is repudiated in the cases first above
cited. In James Mack Co. v. Bear River Milling Co., (1924) 63 Utah 56
227 Pac. 1033, 36 A. L. R. 643, the court points out that even conceding
such requirement, it is satisfied in the case before it.
"3Urbansky v. Kutinsky, (1912) 86 Conn. 22, 84 Atl. 317 (tobacco
left to remain on seller's premises temporarily) ; Castle v. Swift, (1918)
132 Ind. 631, 104 Atl. 187 (eggs to be kept for buyer in seller's cooler) ;
Stem v. Crawford, (1919) 133 Md. 579, 105 Atl. 780 (wheat to be kept for
buyer temporarily on grower's premises (dictum). In 1 Williston, Sales,
2nd ed., sec. 91 this position is criticised as opening wide the door to the
perpetration of frauds. While sustaining the view taken by the authorities
as to goods in the buyer's possession already, and as to goods in the hands of
a third party bailee, Professor Williston distinguishes the case where the
goods are left in the seller's possession. The American Law Institute Re-
statement of Contracts for which Professor Williston is the reporter, in
tentative draft, no. 4, sec. 201 (Feb. 20, 1928), adopts the position that
the seller cannot be the agent of the buyer either to accept or to
receive under this provision of the statute. As explained in the Re-
statement's accompanying commentaries, this position is regarded
by the draftsmen as practically desirable. The authorities principally
relied on to support this view apparently are the cases embodying the
New York rule.
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for the buyer. In order to establish that the seller is holding as
bailee for the buyer and is not holding possession in his own right
it is necessary to show that he has waived his seller's lien.11 4
It will be observed that in all three types of cases just men-
tioned the actual receipt takes place through an agreement relating
to the character of the possession, and does not involve any physi-
cal act whatever outside of the making of the agreement itself.
It has often been asserted that such holdings go beyond the policy
of the statute in that they permit the fact of actual receipt to rest
in words alone." 5  On that ground a special rule was formulated
at an early date in New York that there could be no actual receipt
sufficient to satisfy the statute short of some unequivocal act
beyond the mere words of the agreement."16 The words of the
statute, however, furnish no direct support for such criticism of
the general rule, leaving untouched, as they do, the definition of
"actual receipt." The New York rule has also itself been criti-
cised on the merits. The statute of frauds does not attempt to
do away with parol evidence altogether, nor to prevent the deci-
sion's turning sometimes on parol evidefice, and ought not unneces-
sarily to be so construed as to penalize the parties for adopting
the only natural and practically feasible mode of delivery."17  On
the particular point, however, there being no verbal change in-
volved from the previous statutory language when the Uniform
Sales Act was adopted in New York the New York courts have
shown a tendency to follow their former precedents as authority
under the Uniform Sales Act." 8
"14Northwestern Consol. Milling Co. v. Rosenburg, (C.C.A. 3rd
Cir. 1923) 287 Fed. 785 (seller's bailee preserving seller's lien for the
price) ; Castle v. Swift & Co., (1918) 132 Md. 631, 104 At. 187 (eggs).
"
5 See for instance Dorsey v. Pike, (1889) 50 Hun. (N.Y.) 534,
3 N. Y. S. 730 (engine already in buyer's possession).
116The leading case is Shindler v. Houston, (1848) 1 N. Y. 261,
49 Am. Dec. 316. The seller owned a pile of lumber which was lying
apart from other lumber on a dock where it had been unloaded from a
canal boat. The seller met the buyer at the place where the lumber
lay and the parties struck an oral bargain for the lumber. The New
York court held the bargain unenforceable, there having been no act
manifesting acceptance and receipt. Said the court, (Wright, J.)
"When the memorandum is dispensed with, the statute is not satisfied
with anything but unequivocal acts of the parties; not mere words
that are liable to be misunderstood and misconstrued, and dwell only
in the imperfect memory of witnesses."
17.Burdick, A Statute for Promoting Fraud, (1916) 16 Col. L.
Rev. 273, 279-80; 1 Williston, Sales, 2nd ed., Sec. 87.
"
8sSuch was the forecast by Professor Bogert, at the time the
statute was enacted in New York. Bogert, Sale of Goods in New York
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Actual receipt may be found on receipt by a third party proper-
ly authorized by the buyer to receive on his behalf. Thus de-
livery to a third party who has been designated by the buyer to
receive as his bailee constitutes actual receipt sufficient to satisfy
the statute.119 It is properly said, following this analysis, that
delivery of the goods to a common carrier to be transported to
the buyer in accordance with a previous arrangement is sufficient,
the carier having authority to receive on behalf of the buyer
though it has no corresponding authority to accept. 20 This does
not apply, however, if the seller ships the goods to his own order,
26. It was so held in Broom v. Joselson, (1924) 211 App. Div. 157,
206 N. Y. S. 841 after deliberate discussion of the question merely
as a matter of authority. No attempt was made to discuss its merits.
In De Nunzio v. De Nunzio, (1916) 90 Conn. 342, 97 Ati. 323 while
unnecessary to the decision, the court also repeated some of the old
phrases borrowed from the special New York rule.
119 Sparta Produce Exchange v. Wilson & Co., (1922) 223 Ill. App.
126 (strawberries); Davis Laundry & Cleaning Co. v. Whitmore,
(1915) 92 Oh. St. 44, 110 N. E. 518 (corporate stock).
120Tonkelson v. Malis, (1922) 119 Misc. Rep. 717, 197 N. Y. S.
309 (leather); Gaffers-Hinman Coal Co. v. Wessel, (1928) 132 Misc.
Rep. 907, 230 N. Y. S. 561 (coke). There is also on the point some
contrary authority, going on the basis that the carrier has no authority
to receive on behalf of the buyer within the meaning of the statute
of frauds, -though why the carrier should not have such authority,
admitted in the case of other bailees, is not clear. Chicago Metal Re-
fining Co. v. Jerome Trading Co., (1920) 218 Ill. App. 333 (cement
sacks); Roberts, Johnson & Rand v. Mackowski, (1920) 171 Wis.
420, 177 N. W. 509 (shoes). In Dolan Mercantile Co. v. Marcus,
(1923) 276 Pa. St. 404, 120 Atl. 396 it was asserted that delivery of
goods to a carrier, consigned to the buyer was insufficient as actual
receipt by the buyer, the reason being stated that the carrier could
not be regarded as holding absolutely for the buyer so long as the
seller's right of stoppage in transit in the event of the buyer's in-
solvency remained. The soundness of this position is open to
great question. Tending to show its unsoundness as an original
question is the following quotation, applied by its author to the
question of the seller's lien: "The fact that at the expiration of the
period of credit the lien will revive if the price has not been paid
seems not to preclude actual receipt if the agency of the seller for that
purpose is once admitted to be possible. In the meantime the right of
the buyer to demand the goods has been absolute, and actual receipt,
for however short a period, is enough." I Williston, Sales, 2nd ed.,
Sec. 91, but cf. Sec. 89. It may be remarked that such holdings as
that in Dolan "Mercantile Co. v. Marcus, (1923) 276 Pa. St. 404, 120
Ati. 396 manifest so far as they go a tendency to apply the statute
broadly, and to narrow the exceptions of satisfaction of the statute
which save the enforceability of the particular transaction in question.
In Ft. Dearborn Coal Co. v. Borderland Coal Sales Co., (C.C.A. 6th
Cir. 1925) 7 F. (2nd) 441 delivery of coal to the carrier, consigned
to a third party with whom the seller had had no dealings but to
whom the buyer expected to resell if the quality was satisfactory,
was held not to constitute actual receipt within the statute of frauds.
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thereby reserving in himself the power of disposal at destination,'"
or if he ships them C. 0. D., 12 2 thereby effectively preserving his
seller's lien. A recent case has pressed this limitation so far as
to assert that in no case where the seller's right of stoppage in
transitu on the buyer's supervening insolvency is not negatived
can the carrier as such be regarded as having authority to receive
on behalf of the buyer.
123
Receipt by the buyer of an order bill of lading or other nego-
tiable document of title to the goods satisfies the requirements of
actual receipt within the meaning of the statute of frauds. 24 The
bailee of the goods in such cases has by the issue of the documents
in that form as it were attorned in advance to the holder of the
documents whoever he may be. Other symbolic receipt, while less
familiar, may also be found sufficient. The typical case of the
receipt of a key to the room or building where the goods are
stored readily illustrates the point.125  Other instances of vary-
ing detail may arise to which the same general analysis is applic-
able, that it shows the withdrawal by the 'seller of such actual con-
trol as practically exists and its assumption by the buyer. 25
121Josephson v. Weintraub, (1915) 78 Pa. Super. Ct. 14 (goods
consigned to seller at buyer's destination). Cases where the shipment
is under a bill of lading to the seller's order are equally clear that
the buyer acquires thereby no control over possession, though the
point apparently has not been raised on the question of the statute
of frauds.
'
22The present writer has not noticed any case where such ship-
ment was even claimed to have constituted actual receipt by the buyer.123Dolan Mercantile Co. v. Marcus, (1923) 276 Pa. St. 404, 120
Atl. 396. As to the correctness of this position, see comment on this
case in note 120 above.
124 1n 1 Williston, Sales, 2nd ed., Sec. 93, this position is asserted
confidently as a matter of principle and the available fragmentary
authorities for it cited. No case raising the question seems to have
'arisen under the Uniform Sales Act. In the American Law Institute's
Restatement of Contracts, tentative draft no. 4 (Feb. 20, 1928), Sec.
200 this position is squarely adopted.
'
25Atwell v. Miller, (1854) 6 Md. 10, 61 Am. Dec. 294 (dictum).
126In Walden v. Murdock, (1863) 23 Cal. 540, 83 Am. Dec. 135
cattle roaming the range were collected and branded with purchaser's
brand, and again released to roam the range. This was held to satisfy
the statutory requirements of a continuous change of possession, neces-
sary to validate the sale as against the seller's creditors. Negative
illustrations are equally significant. See W. F. Hall Printing Co. v.
Wells W. & F. Co. & Cromwell Jones, (1926) 241 IIl. App. 146
(delivery of an invoice which was not a document of title held in-
sufficient); Dodd v. Stewart, (1923) 276 Pa. St. 225, 120 Atl. 121 (buyer's
merely securing some plans for installing new engines in a boat held
no receipt of the boat by the buyer).
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Receipt requires more than a mere giving or taking of poses-
sion. The change of possession must have been with the assent
of parties. Thus it has been consistently held that a mere forcible
seizure of the goods by the buyer is not sufficient to satisfy the
statute of frauds.127  Similarly, an attempted delivery by the seller
which the buyer refuses to accept does not constitute receipt, even
though the goods may be left in a position where they are under
the buyer's control. 12 8
SEC. 8. SATISFACTION OF THE STATUTE BY EARNEST OR
PART PAYMENT
The second way of satisfying the statute, according to its pro-
visions, is satisfaction by the giving of earnest or part payment.
Where the facts showing payment, or part payment, are clear it
is readily found that the statute has been satisfied..2 9  Since the
statute requires payment, however, a mere tender which is refused
is not sufficient. 30 Where there have been several transactions
between the parties it may become a closely contested question of
fact for the jury to which contract an admitted payment was
applicable.13' Under the Uniform Sales Act, the part payment
need not be made at the same time that the contract is made. 13 2
The payment is sufficient whether made in money, 133 in goods,' 34
or in services. 13
'127 llinois Meat Co. v. American Malt & Grain Co., (1923) 229
Ill. App. 311 (motors); Brewster Loud Lumber Co. v. General Builders'
Supply Co., (1924) 228 Mich. 559, 200 N. W. 283 (lath seized by buyer
under replevin process).
12 8Dierson v. Petersmeyer, (1899) 109 Iowa 233, 80 N. W. 389
(corn).
12 9Antonacopoulos v. Arax Grocery Co., (1919) 234 Mass. 125,
125 N. E. 161 (rice); Rome v. Gaunt, (1923) 246 Mass. 82, 140 N. E.
242 (wool); Win. H. Barkhorn & Co. v. Zinno, (1925) 3 N. J. Misc. Rep.
1145, 130 At. 823 (lumber); Moskowitz v. White Bros. (App. Div.
1917) 166 N. Y. S. 15 (automobile).
'
3 0Edgerton v. Hodge, (1869) 41 Vt. 676 (cheese).
13 'Truesdell v. Michigan R. Co., (1923) 225 Mich. 374, 196 N, W.
334 (railroad ties); Pucci v. Krauter, (App. Div. 1919) 173 N. Y. S.
405 (oil). In King v. Farmers Grain Co., (1922) 194 Ia. 979, 188
N. W. 720 the court on appeal reversed the case after a jury finding
on the point. There was a vigorous dissent which appeals to the
present writer as being unquestionably correct on the facts as reported.
-
32Earlier local statutes sometimes varied on this point. Where
the Uniform 'Sales Act has been adopted any varying earlier rule on
this point has been changed. Meyers v. Kaufman, (1920) 110 Misc.
Rep. 321, 180 N. Y. S. 403; Gordon v. Witty, (1921) 198 App. Div.
333, 190 N. Y. S. 381.
133 King v. Farmers Grain Co., (1922) 194 Iowa 979, 188 N. W.
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The distinction formerly observed between giving something in
earnest and making part payment seems no longer to have any
practical importance, present day commercial practice generally
looking to part payment and considering any transfer by the buyer
to the seller on account of the bargain as part payment.136 The
placing of forfeit money with a third party to be forfeited on the
buyer's failure to perform, not being part payment, accordingly
does not satisfy the statute. 13 7  Recent cases have also held that
the buyer's furnishing the seller with a gratuity as an inducement
to encourage him to make the deal does not satisfy the statute
where if is not given and received as part payment under the con-
tract. 8" Similarly, work done by the buyer to put himself in posi-
tion to be able to carry out the contract is not work done for the
seller under the contract and is therefore insufficient to satisfy
the statute as to part payment. 3 9  Cases of this sort obviously
can present extremely close questions of fact as to whether what
is done by the buyer was done for the seller under the contract,
and thereby constitutes part payment, or was done by the buyer
on his own account. 4 0 The bearing of the given facts on the
720 (corn); Antonacopoulos v. Arax Grocery Co., (1919) 234 Mass.
125, 125 N. E. 161 (rice); Moskowitz v. White Bros., (App. Div.
1917) 166 N. Y. S. 15 (automobile).13 4Shadbolt "& Boyd Iron Co. v. Long, (1920) 172 Wisc. 591, 179
N. W. 785 (payment in property on account of subscription for
corporate stock). The Uniform Sales Act, Sec. 9 (2) expressly provides
that the price may be made payable in any personal property.
'
3 NDriggs v. Bush, (1908) 152 Mich. 53, 115 N. W. 985, 15 L. R.
A. (NS.) 654 (hay, the buyer to bale it for the seller).
181 Williston, Sales, 2nd ed., Sec. 97. In Nelson v. Landesman,(1922) 118 Misc. Rep. 832, 193 N. Y. S. 574 the seller orally sold a
store business with a stock of merchandise at the price of $14,000.00,
the seller receiving from the buyer at the time a "deposit" of $500.00.
The buyer later sought to avoid the contract, contending that the
money had not been paid on account of the price but was merely a
deposit to insure good faith. The court treated it as part payment.
'
37Howe v. Hayward, (1871) 108 Mass. 54; Jennings & Silvey v.
Dunham, (1895) 60 Mo. App. 635.
13 8Wenger v. Grummel, (1920) 136 Md. 80, 110 Atl. 206 (tomato
seeds or plants furnished to seller of tomato crop by contract buyer, as
an accommodation).
13 9 Manufacturers' Light & Heat Co. v. Lamp, (1921) 269 Pa. St.
517, 112 Atl. 679 (buyer of gas expending labor and materials in instal-
lation of pipe line to reach the region of the producing wells).
140 In Hudnut v. Weir, (1884) 100 Ind. 501 the case as first pleaded
showed an oral contract to sell five thousand bushels of corn at fifty
cents per bushel, the buyer to furnish sacks in which seller was to make
delivery. The sacks were furnished, but the buyer later refused de-
livery and when sued set up the statute of frauds. The court on
demurrer held there had been no part payment by the buyer to the
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legal question involved, moreover, frequently can be properly ap-
preciated only when viewed in the light afforded by familiarity
with the practical aspects of current commercial practices.14 .
The giving of the buyer's note or check for the price of the
goods has traditionally been held not sufficient to satisfy the
statute as to payment,'142 such being regarded as conditional pay-
ment only, unless shown to have been given and accepted in abso-
seller by the furnishing of the sacks. The plaintiff thereafter so
amended his pleading as to allege that a part of the price bargained
for was that the buyer should furnish sacks. On demurrer admitting
the facts as pleaded the court( (1888) 115 Ind. 525, 18 N. E. 24) held
the facts as pleaded and admitted by the demurrer showed a good cause
of action, there having been part payment. In the opinion, however,
the court suggests that "It is, perhaps, difficult to conceive how the
averment can be established by evidence, but with that question we
are not now concerned, for it is admitted to be true."141The point is well shown in contrasting the prevailing, and the
dissenting opinions in DeWaal v. Jamison, (1917) 176 App. Div. 756,
163 N. Y. S. 1045. In that case plaintiff and defendant were both en-
gaged in the sugar trade in New York City. Plaintiff made an oral deal
with defendant whereby plaintiff was to supply to defendant on Aug.
3rd 10,000 bags of sugar at the market rate that day, and that defendant
should sell to plaintiff at any time within ten days an equal amount of
sugar at the same price. Plaintiff supplied the sugar and defendant
paid for it. When plaintiff later demanded sugar as agreed defendant
refused, and when sued set up the statute of frauds. The majority of
the court sustained the defense, treating the transaction as involving
two contracts, performance of one not being part payment under the
other. The dissenting opinion treated the case as presenting but one
contract with separate clauses for successive performances. Said the
dissenting judge (Dowling, J. at p. 1049), "The plaintiff also showed
that the transaction in question was n6t unique or extraordinary in
the sugar business, but one having a definite trade existence, and
known as 'switching' whereby a party having sugar ready for delivery
is willing to exchange it for sugar to arrive later: the party with whom
he contracts having immediate use for the sugar, and he himself de-
siring to use the same amount later. By this practice those who need
the goods at once are able to get them at a fixed price, mutually
agreeable, without going into the market, and the return of a similar
amount of the goods at the same price is insured." See, however, for
some broader considerations of policy tending to support the majority,
the observations on this case in note 83 above.
'142Illinois-Indiana Fair Ass'n v. Phillips, (1927) 328 Ill. 368, 159
N. E. 815 (note dishonored at maturity); Hessburg v. Welsh (App.
Div. 1914) 147 N. Y. S. 44 (buyer stopping payment on check before
it was cashed); Gay v. Sundquist, (1919) 42 S. D. 327, 175 N. W. 190
(seller destroying buyer's check without cashing it, on repenting of the
oral bargain). In Michelin Tire Co. v. Williams, (1928) 125 Or. 689,
268 Pac. 56 the buyer's delivery to the seller of a third party's
guaranty of payment was held not to render the oral contract en-
forceable, delivery of a promise to pay as distinguished from a present
discharge of existing obligation being said not to constitut6 part
payment. Other authorities to the same effect are cited in 1 Williston,
Sales 2nd ed., Sec. 98.
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lute payment. 4 ' In recent times, however, the accuracy as well
as the expediency of this technical interpretation of the term
"payment" in connection with the application of the statute has
been sharply questioned. Certainly a check or note, whether
taken in conditional or in absolute payment, furnishes objective
external evidence that there was a transaction thereby meeting the
mischief at which these sections of the statute was aimed. 44 The
minute inquiry as to whether it was a conditional or an absolute
payment, an inquiry in most instances arising only as an after-
thought and not at the time present to the conscious contemplation
of the parties, is an obscure technical inquiry whose determining
factors must all rest in mere words. It hardly seems wise as an
original question to fix upon that point of demarcation in drawing
up a rule to prevent the perpetration of fraud, and there is no
evidence that any such distinction was intended by the words of
the statute. Accordingly, some of the late cases have argued that
the term "payment" as used by the statute must be understood
in its loose popular sense, in which case payment by note45 or
check' 46 manifestly is sufficient. More technical in its analysis
but reaching the same result in sustaining the sufficiency of such"
payment is the position adopted on the point in the American Law
Institute Restatement on Contracts. 4" It is there asserted in sub-
stance that a present payment results on the giving of a note or
check, in that the original claim is suspended in the interval, the
negotiable promise or order being taken in its stead, that pay-
431In addition to the cases cited in the preceding note see Dutton
v. Bennet, (1926) 256 Mass. 397, 152 N. E. 621 (buyer's check retained
by seller for sixty days without cashing); Technical Economist Corpora-
tion v. Moors, (1926) 255 Mass. 591, 152 N. E. 83 (buyer's check kept
by seller but later returned because seller concluded to sell to others);
Jersey City Machine Co. v. Walter H. Foster Co. (App. Div. 1918) 172
N. Y. S. 121 (seller procuring buyer's check for part of price to be
certified, and thereafter keeping it for two weeks, returning it later
only on finding itself unable to procure delivery of the goods con-
tracted to be sold); Charles R. Ablett Co. v. Spencer, (1927) 130 Misc.
Rep. 416, 224 N. Y. S. 251 (seller's receipting the bill for the goods on
receiving the buyer's check for the price asserted to show check was
received by the seller in absolute payment).
'
44Llewellyn, Cases and Materials on Sales 953; Charles R. Ablett
Co. v. Spencer, (1927) 130 Misc. Rep. 416, 224 N. Y. S. 251.
14SBohrer v. Auslander, (1929) 133 Misc. Rep. 597, 233 N. Y. S. 182
'
46Charles R. Ablett Co. v. Spencer, (1927) 130 Misc. Rep. 416, 224
N. Y. S. 251.
14 American Law Institute Restatement of Contracts, (tentative
draft no. 4), sec. 202, as explained in its accompanying commentaries
to sec. 202.
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ment being subject, however, to the condition subsequent that the
note or check must not be dishonored on due presentation. Where
the buyer does not give his own check or note for the price but
transfers to the seller, who accepts it in payment and not merely
as collateral, the negotiable note of a third party, it seems clear
that the statute has been satisfied.148  The parties have agreed to
it as payment in fact, and there is also present the external objec-
tive evidence of the transfer of the negotiable paper. The same
position is also taken where the buyer in payment of the goods
makes an assignment to the seller of a parol chose in action which
he holds against a third party,149 unless in the jurisdiction the
special New York rule is followed which requires that satisfac-
tion of the statute, apart from a memorandum, must be by some
unequivocal act and cannot take place by mere words alone.
Where the buyer does not give in payment for the goods his
claim against a third party, but orally gives the seller a discharge
of a claim owing to the buyer from the seller himself, there is
great difficulty in accurately applying the law with respect to part
payment under the statute of frauds. All the authorities seem
to agree that if the facts are that the transaction did not amount
to a present discharge of the debt but was rather merely a prom-
ise later to discharge it on receiving delivery of the goods there
has been no payment as yet and the statute is not satisfied. 150 If
the transaction, properly interpreted, amounted to a present dis-
charge of the seller's debt to the buyer, as the price of the goods
bargained for, some authorities applying the statute literally hold
that the statute is satisfied, there being in fact payment and the
statute making no exception as to its form.'-' The majority of
148Combs v. Bateman, (1850) 10 Barb. (N.Y.) 573 (dictum); 1
Mechem, Sales, sec. 414.
149American Law Institute Restatement of Contracts (tentative
draft no. 4, Feb. 20, 1928) sec. 202, illustration (b). There seem to
be few if any cases where the particular point has been directly ad-
judicated. In Cotterill v. Stevens, (1860) 10 Wis. 366 a novation
arranged by the buyer's assuming the seller's debt to a third party,
the third party assenting, was held to constitute payment within the
meaning of the statute of frauds.
'50The leading case is Walker v. Nussey, (1847) 16 M. & W. 302.
A recent case in which the facts were thus interpreted is Brewster
Loud Lumber Co. v. General Builder's- Supply Co., (1924) 228 Mich.
559, 200 N. W. 283 where an oral bargain that the seller in a former
deal should take back certain lath and cancel the debt due by the buyer
for it was held not enforceable.
10 'There is a dictum to this effect in Walker v. Nussey, (1847)
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reported cases, however, following on the point substantially the
New York rule, have asserted either by decision or dictum that
even though a present discharge of the seller's antecedent debt to
the buyer were intended, such discharge must be evidenced by
some receipt, memorandum, or book entry, and cannot for satis-
fying the statute of frauds be rested wholly in mere words. 52
SEC. 9. SATISFACTION OF THE STATUTE BY WRITTEN
MEMORANDUM
The third way in which the statute of frauds may be satisfied
with respect to transactions involving goods, according to its own
provisions, is by "some note or memorandum in writing of the
contract or sale . . .signed by the -party to be charged or his
agent in that behalf."'5  This is the most familiar requirement
found in the statute. It is this requirement that applies in by
far the largest group of cases, the cases where there has been no
partial performance either by acceptance and receipt or by part
payment. Innumerable controversies over the application of this
requirement have occupied the attention of courts in years past.
Changes continue to be made from time to time in the manner
of doing business, in the attempt to adjust business practices to
the varied needs and opportunities occasioned by changing times
and conditions. These changes in business practices in turn fre-
quently give rise to novel questions with regard to the application
of the statute of frauds. Accordingly, in the current litigation
on the topic, while old established points may at times recur,
there is much relatively new material growing out of recently
developed business practices not directly touched in the older cases.
In the present discussion, while reference is made to leading
cases, particular attention is given to the current litigation over
the application of the provisions of the statute' of frauds as
formulated in the Uniform Sales Act.
16 M. & W. 302. For recent cases supporting this position, see Obear-
Nester Glass Co. v. Lax & Shaw, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1926) 11 F. (2d)
240; Wheeler v. Barnes, (1923) 100 Conn. 57, 122 Atl. 917; Selznick v.
Holmes Pittsburgh Automobile Co., (1922) 275 Pa. St. 1, 118 At.
553 (buyer of an automobile at the time in possession of a third
party garageman for repairs taking it in discharge of a debt due him
from the seller).
152Scott v. Mundy, (1922) 193 Iowa 1360, 188 N. W. 972, 23 A. L.
R. 460 (citing most of the available authorities); Milos v. Covace-
vich, (1901) 40 Or. 239, 66 Pac. 914.
153Uniform Sales Act, sec. 4 (1).
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It is elementary under the wording of the statute adopted in
the Uniform Sales Act that the memorandum need not be given
at the time of the transaction. A memorandum given at a later
time is sufficient. 1 4 Neither is it necessary that the memorandum
be given with the intention of furnishing the writing required to
make the agreement enforceable. So long as the memorandum
which is made satisfies the requirements set out in the statute it
is immaterial with what intention it was made. 155
a. Form of the Menorandu--Incorporation by Reference-
Denials.-No particular form of memorandum is required under
the statute. A formal written contract may serve as a memo-
randum,5 0 but an informal memorandum showing the terms of
an oral contract, if properly signed by the party to be charged,
is equally effective to make the contract enforceable. 57  The
memorandum may thus be found in the form of invoices, 5 8 order
blanks, 15 letters, €0 telegrams,'"" or in whatever other particular
form it happens to suit the convenience of parties to express the
terms in signed writings. 0 2
' 4Bailey v. Sweeting, (1861) 9 C. B. N. S. 843 (chimney glasses);
Spiegel v. Lowenstein, (1914) 162 App. Div. 443, 147 N. Y. S. 655
(copper wire); Mead v. Leo Sheep Co., (1925) 32 Wyo. 313, 232 Pac.
511 (hay).
15 Baster v. Lustberg, (1923) 205 App. Div. 673, 200 N. Y. S.
125 (cotton cloth). The cases holding that a written offer, signed
by the offeror defendant is a sufficient memorandum on oral proof of
its acceptance by plaintiff bear out the same position. See authorities
in note 180 below.
1561 Williston, Sales, 2nd ed., sec. 101.
'57Mason-Heflin Coal Co. v. Currie, (1921) 270 Pa. St. 221, 113
At. 202 (coal) (dictum).
158W. F. Hall Printing Co. v. Wells W. & F. Co. & Cromwell
Jones, (1926) 241 Ill. App. 146 (holding the invoice insufficient in
the instance, however, for lack of setting out the parties and terms).
'
55Atlas Shoe Co. v. Lewis, (1922) 202 App. Div. 244, 195 N. Y. S.
618 (salesman's order blank referred to in buyer's letter).
lOOUnion Hay Co. v. Des Moines Flour & Feed Co., (1924) 159
Minn. 106, 198 N. W. 312 (middlings); Blair & Rolland v. Turner,
(App. Div. 1918) 168 N. Y. S. 660 (lumber); Jersey City Machine
Co. v. Walter H. Foster Co., (App. Div. 1918) 172 N. Y. S. 121
(machinery); Phillips Jones Co. v. Reiling & Schoen, (1920) 193 App.
Div. 116, 184 N. Y. S. 387 (cloth); Briggs & Turivas v. Logan Iron
& Steel Co., (1923) 276 Pa. St. 326, 120 Atl. 280 (letters showing'
the terms, though interspersed with suggestions and requests for
changes not acceded to by the other party).
'O'Straesser-Arnold Co. v. Franklin Sugar Refining Co., (C.C.A.
7th Cir. 1925) 8 F. (2d) 601 (sugar); Technical Economist Corpora-
tion v. Moors, (1926) 255 Mass. 591, 152 N. E. 83 (refrigerating
machinery).
16
2 1n Drury v. Young, (1882) 58 Md. 546, 42 Am. Rep. 343- a
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The memorandum may consist of several writings only the
last of which is signed so long as their connection with each other
to show the entire contract appears. This connection may appear
by direct physical attachment of the papers,'1 63 by direct words of
reference in the signed paper incorporating therein the unsigned
paper, 164 or by such internal evidence from the contents of the
papers as to lead to the necessary inference that they are con-
nected as component parts of one written memorandum of the
transaction signed by the party to be charged. 165 Parol evidence
memorandum made by defendant's clerk and filed in his safe, never
delivered to plaintiff, was held sufficient. In Gravenhorst v. Turner,
(1926) 215 App. Div. 617, 213 N. Y. S. 468 a signed entry in a broker's
book was held sufficient. In M. Lowenstein & Sons Inc. v. Noon Bag
Co., (1924) 111 Or. 421, 226 Pac. 222 the entry in the broker's book
was held insufficient only for lack of the signature. In 1 Wiliston,
Sales, 2nd ed., sec. 101, is compiled a large array of common law
authorities in detail holding good as a memorandum a great variety
of papers and documents.
'.
3Tallman v. Franklin, (1856) 14 N. Y. 584 (a land deal papers
pinned 'together); Jones Brothers v. Joyner, (1900) 82 L. T. R. 768
(order for hops, signed by buyer in seller's order book, seller's name
not appearing on the signed sheet but appearing on the cover of the
book).
164Franklin Sugar Co. v. Egerton, (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1923) 288 Fed.
698 (sugar); Milliken-Tomlinson Co. v. Am. Sugar Refining Co.,
(C.C.A. 1st. Cir. 1925) 9 F. (2d) 809 (sugar); Franklin Refining Co.
v. Wm. D. Mullen Co., (C.C.A. 3rd Cir. 1926) 12 F. (2d) 885 (incor-
poration of an order by reference to its order number); Mayer v. Hirsch,
(1918) 212 Il. App. 441 ("referring to your contract no. 3543"); Schmoll
Fils & Co. v. Wheeler, (1922) 242 Mass. 464, 136 N. E. 164 (buyer's
letter referring to seller's invoice of hides which stated the terms
at length); Spiegel v. Lowenstein, (1914) 162 App. Div. 443, 147 N. Y.
S. 655 (copper wire). Reference in a signed paper to an oral conversa-
tion containing the terms is of course insufficient. White Co. v. Hol-
land Co-op. Ass'n, (1923) 222 Mich. 58, 192 N. W. 552 (cotton seed
meal); Carnegie Steel Co. v. Mugler, (App. Div. 1913) 141 N. Y. S. 94.
165Straesser-Arnold Co. v. Franklin Sugar Refining Co., (C.C.A.
7th Cir. 1925) 8 F. (2d) 601 (sugar); Howell v. Witman-Schwartz
Corporation, (C.C.A. 3rd Cir. 1925) 7 F. (2d) 513 (sugar order given
orally to broker who filled it out in writing and sent it to seller, recog-
nized in buyer's letters asking cancellation on "this car of sugar" and
directing that no shipments be made till further advised); Lerned
v. Wannemacher, (1864) 9 Allen (Mass.) 412 (coal); Kline v. Minnesota
Cent. Creameries, (1923) 156 -Minn. 6, 193 N. W. 958 (series of letters
and telegrams containing a common identifying number of the car'bf
coal shipped); Atlas Shoe Co. v. Lewis, (1922) 202 App. Div. 244, 195
N. Y. S. 618 (buyer's letter, identifying salesman's order by the con-
tents); Tilton & Keeler v. Bachrach, (1923) 121 Misc. Rep. 708, 202
N. Y. S. 506, (,buyer's letter referring to contents of seller's confirma-
tion of order held sufficient though misstating the date for delivery);
Fredonia Seed Co. v. Nathan & Bro., (1924) 83 Pa. Super. Ct. 374
(several sheets constituting one order, consecutively numbered, and
correctly totalled a't the end, though without individual page totals
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is said not to be admissible to supply the terms of reference
between several papers, where there is nothing else to. connect
them,1"' but parol evidence may be admissible with respect to
circumstances of delivery167 and in explanation of terms in the
writings which, when their application is thus explained, are seen
to constitute words of reference.1 68  The same may now be said
for terms which when thus explained furnish internal evidence
in the writirigs themselves that they are connected with each
other, 69 although it is very difficult in this matter to lay down
any exact rule as to how definite such internal evidence must be.'70
carried over from page to page); Mead v. Leo Sheep Co., (1925) 32
Wyo. 313, 232 Pac. 511 (exchange of several signed letters, their
connection shown by coincidences as to names, dates, references to
subject matter, and period of time of the contract).
16ONorthwestern Consol. Milling Co. v. Rosenberg, (C.C.A. 3rd
Cir. 1923) 287 Fed. 785 (flour); Western Metals Co. v. Hartman Ingot
Metal Co., (1922) 303 III. 479, 135 N. E. 744 (scrap brass); Hewett Grain
& Provision Co. v. Spear, (1925) 222 Mich. 608, 193 N. W. 291
(potatoes); Paturzo v. Ferguson, (1924) 280 Pa. St. 379, 124 At. 481
(sulphate of copper); Swift & Co. v. Heehan, (1925) 283 Pa. St. 429,
129 Atl. 324. Certain authorities go farther, holding that parol evidence
is admissible to show that the various papers refer to the same transac-
tion, which is held enough to incorporate the unsigned writing with
the signed writing. Nickerson v. Weld, (1910) 204 Mass. 346, 90 N.
E. 589 (real estate); Bresky v. Rosenberg, (1926) 256 Mass. 66, 152
N. E. 347 (flour). Such cases are severely criticised in 1 Williston,
Sales, 2nd ed., sec. 109-110.
'167 Delaware Mills v. Carpenter Bros., (1922) 200 App. Div. 324,
193 N. Y. S. 201, affirmed in (1923) 235 N. Y. 537, 139 N. E. 725
(stock feed). In Elmore v. Busseno, (1916) 175 App. Div. 233, 161
N. Y. S. 533 it was held that defendant's letter referring in general
terms to "a future order standing with you" could not be applied as a
reference to a confirmation of the oral order which plaintiff had
prepared but which it did xot appear had been sent to the defendant or
received by him.
'"
6 Beckwith v. Talbot, (1877) 95 U. S. 289, 24 L. Ed. 496 (cattle);
Kahn v. Carl Schoen Silk Corporation, (1925) 147 Md. 516, 128 At.
359, 44 A.. L. R. 285 (silk dress goods); Kronfeld v. Natelson, (1920)
182 N. Y. S. 477 ("terms as had" contained in the buyer's order shown
by parol to refer to familiar terms set out in earlier contracts between
the parties); Delaware Mills v. Carpenter Bros., (1922) 200 App. Div.
324, 193 N. Y. S. 201 affirmed in (1923) 235 N. Y. 537, 139 N. E. 725
(stock feed); Paturzo v. Ferguson, (1924) 280 Pa. St. 379, 124 Atl.
481 (sulphate of copper); Swift & Co. v. Meehan, (1925) 283 Pa. St. 429,
129 Atl. 324.
169In Davis v. Arnold, (1929) 267 Mass. 103, 165 N. E. 885 a stock
broker's statement of account, showing the amount due, which in-
cluded thle price of stock sold, was held a sufficient reference when
signed by buyer as being a correct statement of amount.
17 0 "We exclude the writing that refers us to spoken words of
promise. We admit the one that bids us ascertain a place or a rela-
tion by comparison of the description with some 'manifest, external,
and continuing fact' . . . The statute must not be pressed to the
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Letters purporting to cancel an oral contract, if stating its
terms either directly or through incorporation of other writings
containing the terms, themselves supply the necessary written
memorandum to make the contract enforceable.17 The same is
true of letters in terms repudiating the obligation of the contract,
if the existence of the contract is recognized therein. 7 2 Cor-
respondence denying the existence of the contract claimed, how-
ever, furnishes no written and signed admission of its existence
and therefore is usually held not to be sufficient to satisfy the
statute.18  A milder case of the same sort is found in mutual
extreme of a literal and rigid logic. Some compromise is inevitable,
if words are to fulfill their function as symbols of things and of ideas.
How many identifying tokens we are to exact, the reason and common
sense of the situation must tell us. 'What, then, is a sufficient descrip-
tion in writing? No one can say beforehand' . . . You cannot have a
description in writing that will shut out all controversy, even with the
help of a map. . . .The memorandum exacted by the statute does not
have to be in one document. It may be pieced together out of separate
writings, connected with one another either expressly or by the internal
evidence of subject matter and occasion." Cardozo, J. in Marks v.
Cowdin, (1919) 226 N. Y. 138, 144, 145, 123 N. E. 139, 141.
17 'Straesser-Arnold Co. v. Franklin Sugar Refining Co., (C.C
7th Cir. 1925) 8 F. (2d) 601 (sugar); Mayer v. Hirsch, (1918) 212 Ill.
App. 441; Kahn v. Carl 'Schoen Silk Corporation, (1925) 147 Md. 516,
128 Atl. 359, 44 A. L. R. 285 (silk dress goods); Spiegel v. Lowen-
stein, (1914) 162 App. Div. 443, 147 N. Y. S. 655 (cancelling letter and
telegram, acknowledging existence of the contract, followed later by
letter referring to its terms but denying its existence for lack of agent's
authority); Willis v. Imperial Underwear Co. (-App. Div. 1916) 159
N. Y. S. 729; Wiarda v. Independent Chemical Co., (App. Div. 1916)
162 N. Y. S. 158; Atlas Shoe Co. v. Lewis, (1922) 202 App. Div. 244,
195 N. Y. S. 618 (cancellation because of delay by carrier in making
delivery). In Schwarzenbach v. Schwartz, (App. Div. 1922) 193 N. Y.
S. 573 the buyer gave an oral order for goods. The seller sent a
written confirmation which he asked the buyer to sign. The buyer
returned the written confirmation unsigned and requested cancellation
as he found he could not use the goods. The court held no sufficient
memorandum was made out, the buyer having given no written and
signed recognition of the seller's written confirmation. If the request
for cancellation be construed as applying to the oral order the case
can be supported as consistent with the other authorities on the point.
If it be regarded as applying to the seller's written confirmation it is
hard to see how there can be said not to be recognition of it.
17 2Bailey v. Sweeting, (1861), 9 C. B. N. S. 843; Abeles & Taussig
Lumber Co. v. Northwest Side Lumber Co., (1926) 239 Ill. App. 623
(rejection of lumber for alleged inferior quality).
17 3Ebling Brewing Co. v. Cereal Products Co., (C.C.A. 2nd Cir.
1925) 6 F. (2d) 994 (malt); Ft. Dearborn Coal Co. v. Borderland Coal
Sales Co., (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1925) 7 F. (2d) 441 (coal); Schmoll Fils
& Co. v. Wheeler, (1922) 242 Mass. 464, 136 N. E. 164 (dictum);
Franklin Sugar Refining Co. v. John, (1924) 279 Pa. St. 104, 123 AtL.
685 (sugar). In Upton Mill, etc., Co. v. Baldwin Flour Mills, (1920)
147 Minn. 205, 179 N. W. 904 the purported seller in his letter, re-
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correspondence which does not agree as to the terms of the con-
tract claimed, each party setting out different terms.1' In such
cases any words of reference to the other's letters, etc., obviously
indicate no admission that the terms there set out are recognized
as correct. Where the available memoranda are conflicting it is
a question of fact which, if any, accurately states the oral contract
which was entered into by the partiesY.
7 5
b. Coa teuts of Menwranudin.-To satisfy the statute of
frauds, the memorandum must contain the essential terms of the
contract or sale. Where the memoranda in the form of letters,
etc., merely show that preliminary negotiation by the parties did
not result in a completed agreement, it is very clear that the
statute of frauds is not satisfied for the very good reason that no
contract or sale is shown.Y16 The memorandum must conform
to the contract actually made, or it is not a memorandum of the
ferring to buyer's memorandum of terms, denied his agent's authority
to enter into such contract and refused to confirm. The court held there
was no sufficient memorandum signed by the party and admitting the
contract. This case may be compared with the case of Spiegel v.
Lowenstein, (1914) 162 App. Div. 443, 147 N. Y. S. 655 where the
seller first sent telegram and letter cancelling the contract, entered
into by his agent over the telephone because he found himself unable to
supply the goods, but not stating the terms, followed later by a letter
referring to the terms, and to the earlier correspondence and now
denying the existence of a .contract on the asserted ground that his
agent had no authority to make it. The court held the memorandum
sufficient.
174Quinn-Shepardson.Co. v. Triumph Farmers' Elevator Co., (1921)
149 Minn. 24, 182 N. W. 710 (oats and corn); F. Kieser & Son Co., Inc.
v. Hallock, (1922) 201 App. Div. 186, 194 N. Y. S. 737 (linseed meal);
James Talcott, Inc. v. Greenstein, (1924) 210 App. Div. 632, 206 N. Y.
S. 471 (handkerchiefs); Southern Pines Sales Corp. v. Braddock Lum-
ber Co., (1923) 81 Pa. Super. Ct. 309 (lumber).
1'7 Union Hay Co. v. Des Moines Flour & Feed Co. (1924) 159
Minn. 106, 198 N. W. 312 (middlings); Bauman v. Medle-Lunepp Co.,
(App. Div. 1915) 153 N. Y. S. 896 (nets).
176Ft. Dearborn Coal Co. v. Borderland Coal Sales Co., (C.C.A.
6th Cir. 1925) 7 F. (2d) 441 (terms of order rejected); Glen Fall,;
Lumber Co. v. Ryerson, (1916) 175 App. Div. 759, 162 N. Y. S. 427
(purported acceptance changing material terms of the offer); Lipschitz)
v. Grace, (1918) 104 Misc. Rep. 55, 171 N. Y. S. 330 affirmed (1919)
175 N. Y. S. 910; Peninsular Trading Agency v. Frazier, (App. Div.
1919) 176 N. Y. S. 739 (purported acceptance varying essential terms
of the order); Poel v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., (1915) 216
N. Y. 310, 110 N. E. 619 (rubber); Paturzo v. Ferguson, (1924) 280
Pa. St. 379, 124 Atl. 481 (letter failing to show reinstatement of contract
for sulphate of copper after an admitted revocation); Witro Mfg. Co. v.
Standard Chemical Co., (1927) 291 Pa. St. 85, 139 Atl. 615 (corres-
pondence showing preliminary negotiation only).
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contract which the parties made. 7  Instances are frequent where
the signed writing at hand is held insufficient as a memorandum
for lack of definiteness where it is apparent therefrom that the
parties had some sort of deal but its terms are not set out nor
adequate reference made to other papers where they are set out.'
On the other hand, it is usually held that if the memorandum sets
out adequately the terms of the defendant's promise or transfer
and is signed by him it is sufficient although the consideration for
such promise or transfer, if already executed, is not set out. 7 9
177Antonzcoupoulos v. Arax Grocery Co., (1919) 234 Mass. 125,
125 N. E. 161 (rice); Dutton v. Bennett, (1926) 256 Mass. 397, 152
N. E. 621 (timber to be cut and removed); Wagner-White Co. v.
Holland Co-op Ass'n, (1923) 222 Mich. 58, 192 N. W. 552 (cotton seed
meal); Schaefer v. Alvarez, (1928) 249 N. Y. 117, 162 N. E. 603 (hay).
178W. F. Hall Printing Co. v. Wells W. & F. Co. & Cromwell
Jones, (1926) 241 Ill. App. 146 (paper); Webster v. Condon, (1924)
248 Mass. 269, 142 N. E. 777 (oats); Bauer v. Victory Catering Co.,
(1925) 101 N. J. Eq. 364, 128 Atl. 262 (silverware); Carter Macy & C
Inc. v. Matthews, (1927) 220 App. Div. 679, 222 N. Y. S. 472 (t,
Mason-Heflin Coal Co. v. Currie, (1921) 270 Pa. St. 221, 113 Atl. 202
(coal); Swift & Co. v. Meehan, (1925) 283 Pa. St. 429, 129 Atl. 324. In
Hessberg v. Welsh, (1914) 85 Misc. Rep. 24, 147 N. Y. S. 44 a check
held insufficient as a memorandum of the contract. In Kohn & Baer
v. Ariowitsch Co., (1918) 181 App. Div. 415, 168 N. Y. S. 909 a mem-
orandum was held insufficient for lack of specifying quality or grade
of skins bargained for, there being various grades familiar in the trad
and nothing in evidence as to trade custom or otherwise to indicate
what quality or grade was meant. In Mesibov, Glinert & Levy, Inc.,
v. Cohen, Bros. Mfg. Co., (1926) 218 App. Div. 142, 217 N. Y. S. 870
a memorandum was held insufficient for failing to specify the width of
the cloth bargained for, where it was contracted for by the pound, the
weight varying with the width.
179In Hanson v. Marsh, (1888) 40 Minn. 1, 40 N. W. 841 a mem-
orandum not reciting the price which the plaintiff was to pay was held
insufficient, the payment agreed upon not being actually made but
remaining unperformed. In Fredenburg v. Horn, (1923) 108 Or. 672,
218 Pac. 939, 30 A. L. R. 1153 a memorandum was held sufficient where
the writing evidenced the transfer of cattle, the fact being orally proved
that the transfer was in payment of services already rendered to the
transferror. There is some conflict on the point. The authorities are
compiled in 1 Williston, Sales, 2nd ed., sec. 102 a. The matter is dis-
cussed elaborately on its merits in 1 Williston, Sales, 2nd ed. sec. 102b,
from which is here quoted the following: "Even the word 'promise'
certainly includes in its meaning not simply a statement of the perform-
ance which the promisor was to render, but of the conditions on which.
he was to render such performance .... It is therefore fair to constru6
a provision that a promise shall not be enforceable without a written
memorandum as requiring the memorandum to contain a statement
of all conditions, implied as well as express, qualifying the promise.
The result of such a rule will be that generally executory performance
due from the plaintiff as well as that due from the defendant must be
stated in the memorandum: not as consideration, however, but as
condition. . . . Not only is executed consideration no part of a
'promise' but it seems that such consideration is not part of a 'contract'
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If the memorandum sets out adequately the terms to which the
defendant binds himself by the contract it is said to be immaterial
that the memorandum itself does not set out the acceptance by the
other party by which the transaction became a binding contract.
Accordingly the memorandum may consist of a signed writing
setting out the terms of the defendant's offer which was orally
accepted by the plaintiff.8 0 The written offer, unaccepted, how-
ever, is insufficient, not in that case evidencing the terms of a
contract.' 8 Where the written offer is made by the plaintiff, how-
ever, an oral acceptance by the defendant does not render it
enforceable against him, for lack of being signed by the party to
be charged.'
The memorandum is insufficient if it does not show who are
the parties.'8 3 It is also frequently held that though the memo-
or 'agreement.' . . . The executory performance which will be due from
each party must be stated in the memorandum .... so much of the
bargain as has been fully executed need not be stated. This result is
supported by the weight of authority in the United States .... It seems,
too, that this result is practically the most desirable."
lSoBartlett-Heard Land & Cattle Co. v. Harris, (1925) 28 Ariz.
497, 238 Pac. 327 (cattle); Kohn & ,Baer v. Ariowitsch Co., (1918) 181
App. Div. 415, 168 N. Y. S. 908 (muskrat skins); Bellas Hess & Co. v,
Alexander & Co., (1921) 195 App. 'Div. 313, 186 N. Y. S. 792 (shirts);
Duncan v. Wohl, South & Co., (1922) 201 App. Div. 737, 195 N. Y. S.
381.
18 Ft. Dearborn Coal Co. v. Borderland Coal Sales Co., (C.C.A.
6th Cir. 1925) 7 F. (2d) 441 (coal).
182An even stronger case is Bell Clothes Shops v. Kambler, (1923)
236 N. Y. 569, 142 N. E. 287. As the facts are understood by the court,
the plaintiff in that case gave an order to defendant's salesman, sub-
ject to the approval of defendant's home office. The salesman entered
the order on one of defendant's regular blanks which contained de-
fendant's name printed at the top. Conceding that this printed name
might be regarded as a signature, if adopted for that purpose by the
party, the court nevertheless held that defendant's oral acceptance of
the order did not render it enforceable against him, the printed
signature only authenticating the option to the defendant which in-
volved no obligation. One cannot help wondering how there is any
rational distinction in this respect between a written offer signed by
the defendant and orally accepted by the plaintiff, and a written option
to the defendant, authenticated by his signature and later orally ac-
cepted by him. Where the plaintiff's offer is oral, and defendant's
signed reply is relied on to supply the memorandum, that reply must
run in such terms as to show that a contract is made. Stausebach
v. Audubon Paper Stock Co., (1919) 108 Misc. Rep. 548, 177 N. Y..S.
893.
'
8sChampion v. Plummer, (1805) 1 Bos. & P. N. R. 252, (treacle);
Brown v. Whipple, (1877) 58 N. H. 229 (lumber); W. F. Hall Printing
Co. v: Wells W. & F. Co. & Cromwell Jones, (1926) 241 Ill. App. 146
(paper). Numerous common law cases are cited to the point in 1
Williston, Sales, 2nd ed., sec. 102, note 21. Where the name of the party
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randum shows who are the parties it is not sufficient unless it
shows which party is buyer and which is seller.184 The application
of these rules, however, is greatly qualified by the position that
if parol evidence of the circumstances and trade usages under
which the contract was entered into makes clear the meaning of
its terms the memorandum is sufficient. Thus where both parties
sign a memorandum reciting the sale of a specific house, evidence
of who was the owner of the house readily renders clear which
party is seller and which is buyer. 18 5 This position has been
applied, too, where the deal was not one for specific goods. Thus
evidence that one party was a flour broker and that the other was
a baker has been held persuasive to indicate which party was
seller and which was buyer under a written memorandum reciting
an executory contract for the sale of flour. 88 This analogy was
probably carried beyond what the authorities relied on would jus-
tify in a recent case wherein a written memorandum signed by
both parties recited a contract to sell furs. The court on appeal
held the memorandum sufficient, though it did not recite who was
seller and who was buyer, and though both were fur dealers
occupying adjacent premises, the external circumstances thus shed-
ding no light on the question of which party was buyer and which
was seller.'
It is necessary, similarly, that the price term in the bargain to
which the defendant binds himself be indicated in the memoran-
dum. Numerous cases have held that the memorandum must defi-
nitely indicate the price term upon which the parties agreed. 88
appears in the memorandum in the form of a fictitious name adopted
for the occasion, however, it may be shown by parol, as in other cases
of names the application of which is not clear, to whom the name that is
used refers. Bibb v. Allen, (1893) 149 U. S. 481, 13 Sup. Ct. 950, 37 L.
Ed. 819 (cotton).
'
8 4Wieser v. Emerman & Baumoehl Co., (App. Div. 1920) 185
N. Y. S. 79 (shellac). Several common law cases on the point to the
same effect are cited in 1 Williston, Sales, 2nd ed., sec. 102, note 22.
'
8 5Tohias v. Lynch, (1920) 192 App. Div. 54, 182 N. Y. S. 643
affirmed in (1922) 223 N. Y. 515, 135 N. E. 898 (mem.).
186Newell v. Radford, (1867) L. R. 3 C. P. 52.
'
8aSchwartz v. Vigden, (1924) 210 App. Div. 714, 206 N. Y. S.
321, reversing, (1920) 112 Misc. Rep. 451, 182 N. Y. S. 907.
'
88Howell v. Elk Hill Butter Co., (D.C. Pa. 1923) 294 Fed. 539
(sugar); L. J. Mueller Furnace Co. v. J. A. Batten Stove Supply Co.,
(1926) 79 Colo. 418, 246 Pac. 272 (furnaces); Eagle Paper Box -Co. v.
Gafti-McQuade Co., (1917) 99 Misc. Rep. 508, 164 N. Y. S. 201 (chip
board); Howell v. Garrett & Co., (1926) 218 App. Div. 322, 218 N. Y.
S. 301 (sugar); Franklin Sugar Refining Co. v. Howell, (1922) 274
Pa. St. 190, 118 Atl. 109 (sugar); Franklin Sugar Refining Co. v. Kane
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Here, too, however, evidence of trade usage with reference to
which the bargain was made may render clear the meaning of the
terms used in the memorandum, although it would not be appar-
ent to persons who are without familiarity with such trade
usages. "9 There are somewhat similar decisions with reference
to the necessity of reciting in the memorandum what the parties
agreed upon regarding requirements of delivery, 9 ° and regarding
the property involved in the deal,'- and regarding other essential
terms of the bargain.19 2 Here, too, cases are not lacking where
Milling & Grocery Co., (1923) 278 Pa. St. 105, 122 Atl. 231, 29 A. L. R.
1213 (sugar); Weidner v. National Fisheries Co. (1921) 173 Wis. 559,
181 N. W. 719.
l89Franklin Sugar Refining Co. v. Win. D. Mullen Co., (C.C
3rd Cir. 1926) 12 F. (2) 885 (sugar). The sufficiency of a price notation
of "basis 22 50," as explained by usages in the sugar trade invoking an
existing standard trade differential for determining the exact price on
various grades and packages of sugar has been upheld, after much
controversy, in the following cases: Am. Sugar Refining Co. v. Colvin
Atwell Co., (D.C. Pa. 1923) 286 Fed. 685; Franklin Sugar Refining Co.
v. Egerton, (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1923) 288 Fed. 698; Howell v. Witman-
Schwartz Corporation, (C.C.A. 3rd Cir. 1925) 7 F. (2d) 513; Milliken-
Tomlinson Co. v. Am. Sugar Refining Co., (C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1925)
9 F. (2d) 809; Franklin Sugar Refining Co. v. Lipowicz, (1927) 220
App. Dv. 160, 221 N. Y. S. 11; Franklin Sugar Refining Co. v. John,
(1924) 279 Pa. St. 104, 123 Atl. 685. There is language intimating the
contrary in Franklin Sugar Refining Co. v. Howell, (1922) 274 Pa. St.
190, 118 Atl. 109, and in Howell v. Elk Hill Butter Co., (D.C. Pa.
1923) 294 Fed. 539. These cases have, however, been distinguished in
some of the later cases just cited above on the ground that in these cases
there was no sufficient allegation and proof of the trade meaning relied
on. 900Saco-Lowell Shops v. Clinton Mills Co., (C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1921) 277
Fed. 349, affirmed in (C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1925) 3 F. (2d) 410 (machinery)-
De Waal v. Jamison, (1917) 176 App. Div. 756, 163 N. Y. S. 1045
(sugar); Berman Stores Co. v. Hirsch, (1925) 240 N. Y. 209, 148 N. E.
212 (clothing). Where the bargain made by the parties, however, did
not specify the time for delivery the memorandum is of course sufficient
so long as it contains the terms as made by the parties though it is
equally silent as to delivery. Kriete v. Thomas J. -Myer & Co., (1883)
61 Md. 558 (peaches); Berman Stores Co. v. Hirsch, (1925) 240 N. Y.
209, 148 N. E. 212 (clothing); Pearlberg v. Levisohn, (1920) 112 Misc.
Rep. 95, 182 N. Y. S. 615 (clothing).
191Kronfeld v. Natelson, (App. -Div. 1921) 187 N. Y. S. 449 (mem-
orandum insufficient where omitting a portion of the goods orally bar-
gained for); Le Roy Silk Mills, Inc. v. Majestic Shirt Co., inc., (1924)
209 App. Div. 399, 204 N. Y. S. 528 (42 "pieces" at so much per yard
held insufficient as to quality in absence of proof of custom showing
trade meaning of "piece" in yardage).
192Barrett Mfg. Co. v. Ambrosio, (1916) 90 Conn. 192, 96 Atl. 930
(memorandum insufficient because omitting a provision with reference
to approval of quality of coal tar by highway commissioner); De Waal
v. Jamison, (1917) 176 App. Div. 756. 163 N Y. S. 1045 (sugar);
Manufacturer's Light & Heat Co. v. Lamp, (1921) 269 Pa. St. 517.
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it is held that the terms of the memorandum, though at first sight
unintelligible on such points, may be held sufficient if so explained
by parol evidence of the circumstances and business usages with
reference to which the terms were used as to render their meaning
clear. 9 ' A trade custom to waive the requirements of the statute
112 Atl. 679 (memorandum insufficient for failing to include time during
which contract for supply of gas from well was to run). The quotation
given at note 170 above is also applicable to the discussion at this point.
193Howell v. Witman-Schwartz Corporation, (C.C.A. 3rd Cir.
1925) 7 F. (2d) 513 (brief notations in memorandum, explainable by
usages in the sugar trade); Straesser-Arnold Co. v. Franklin Sugar
Refining Co., (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1925) 8 F. (2d) 601 (technical trade
terms used in memorandum explainable by usages in sugar trade);
Franklin Sugar Refining Co. v. Win. D. Mullen Co., (C.C.A. 3rd Cir.
1926) 12 F. (2d) 885 (memorandum in the form of a few notations, not
self explanatory, but rendered clear in light of usages in the sugar
trade); Bartlett-Heard Land & Cattle Co. v. Harris, (1925) 28 Ariz.
497, 238 Pac. 327 ("the heifers you inspected" held sufficient descrip-
tion though parol testimony necessary to attach the identifying marks
to the proper goods); Brewer v. Horst & Lachmund Co., (1900) 127
Cal. 643, 60 Pac. 418, 50 L. R. A. 240 (numerical figure used in telegram
to describe property purchased explainable); Falletti v. Carrano, (1918)
92 Conn. 636, 103 Atl. 753 (flour) ("to be taken from car" explainable);
New England Dressed Meat & Wool Co. v. Standard Worsted Co.,
(1896) 165 Mass. 328, 43 N. E. 112 (wool); Maurin v. Lyon, (1897) 60
Minn. 257, 72 N. W. 72 (brief notations in memorandum explainable
by usages in the grain trade); Spiegel v. Lowenstein, (1914) 162 App.
Div. 443, 147 N. Y. S. 655 ("usual terms and conditions" may be ex-
plained by parol); Eising v. American Alcohol Co., (App. Div. 1918)
168 N. Y. S. 682 (loose use of terms not fatal where meaning clear
when interpreted in light of business usage); Stausebach v. Andubon
Paper Stock Co., (1919) 108 Misc. Rep. 548, 177 N. Y. S. 893 (am-
biguous language in memorandum explained through practical con-
struction -by conduct of the parties); Le Roy Silk Mills Inc. v. Majestic
Shirt Co. Inc., (1924) 209 App. Div. 399, 204 N. Y. S. 528 (trade
meaning of "piece" in yardage); Samuel Strauss & Co. v. Katz, (1924)
210 App. Div. 405, 206 N. Y. S. 246 (trade meaning of "piece," in
yardage to show quantity); Northeastern Paper Co. v. Concord Paper
Co., (1925) 214 App. Div. 537, 212 N. Y. S. 318 ("all . . . in the ware-
house" held sufficient description); Miles v. Vermont Fruit Co.,
(1924) 98 Vt. 1, 124 Atl. 559 (technical terms explainable-also silence
on point of shipment not fatal, in light of established practice on the
point between parties); Washington Dehydrated Food Co. v. Triton
Co., (1929) 151 Wash. 613, 276 Pac. 562 (parol evidence held admissible
to explain the trade meaning and identify the application of terms
expressed in the writing); Hoberg v. McNevins, (1919) 169 Wis.
486, 173 N. W. 221 (surrounding facts making clear the terms as to
quantity of shares of stock contracted for). For a case contrasting
with the cases just mentioned, and applying the rule that the terms
of the memorandum could not be added to or changed by parol testi-
mony, see C. Noel Legh & Co. v. Stitzinger & Co., (DC. Pa. 1922)
281 Fed. 1015. The difference between that and explaining the trade
meaning of terms by parol testimony can of course become a very
close question of degree.
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is, however, inoperative to change the law laid down by the
statute.19
c. Signature to the Memorandurm.-As the statute requires the
memorandum to be signed by the party to be charged, an unsigned
memorandum is insufficient to satisfy the statute 95 even though
made out by the defendant who is sought to be charged in the
action.198 Signature by the party to be charged in the action is
enough even though the memorandum is not signed by the other
party. 97 Under the language of the Uniform Sales Act, differ-
ing from some of the earlier local versions of the statute, it is
enough if the memorandum is signed by the party, even though
it is not subscribed at the end.198 The position of the signature
on the paper is unimportant,' as is also the form in which it
appears,2 0 so long as the signature that is used was placed on the
paper with the intention of authenticating the instrument.20 1 This
rule is carried to such lengths that printed names already on the
paper even though in the form of letter heads or firm names
printed at the top of order blanks are held to be sufficient if shown
to have been adopted for the occasion as the authenticating sig-
nature.202 If such adoption for the occasion of already printed
194Webster v. Condon (1924) 248 Mass. 269, 142 N. E. 777 (oats).
205Wexelblatt v. Katman, (1920) 75 Pa. Super. Ct. 219 (cotton
goods).
'19 Illinois Meat Co. v. American Malt & Grain Co., (1923) 229
Ill. App. 311 (motors); M. Lowenstein & Sons, Inc. v. Noon Bag.
Co., (1924) 111 Or. 421, 226 Pac. 222.
'
9 7Morin v. Martz, (1868) 13 Minn. 191 (wheat); Bache v. Bank-
ograph Co., (1922) 120 Misc. Rep. 44, 197 N. Y. S. 663 (foreign money).9
sCohen v. Walker, (App. Div. 1922) 192 N. Y. S. 2289 9 Archbold v. Lo Truglio, (1918) 91 N. J. L. 375, 103 Atl. 987
(buyer's signature sufficient though placed in the space preceded by
a "per" under seller's signature); Pearlberg v. Levisohn (1920) 112
Misc. Rep. 95, 182 N. Y. S. 615 (name printed at top adopted as a
signature); Quinn-Shepardson Co. v. Triumph Farmer's Elevator Co.,
(1921) 149 Minn. 24, 182 N. W. 710 (signature on separate sheet of
paper sufficient if connected with the memorandum by appropriate
reference-failing in that in instant case).20
°In 1 Williston, Sales, 2nd ed., sec. 112 are compiled many
instances from the common law authorities sustaining the sufficiency
of signatures in pencil, by initials, :by typewriter, by mark, etc.2 0 Lee v. Vaughan's Seed Store, (1911) 101 Ark. 68, 141 S. W.
496, 37 L. R. A. (N.S.) 352; Archbold v. Lo Truglio, (1918) N. J. L.
375, 103 Atl. 987.2 02Prairie State Grain & Elevator Co. v. Wrede, (1920) 217 Ill.
App. 407 (corn); Drury v. Young. (1882) 58 Md. 546; Goldowitz v.
Henry Kupfer & Co., (1913) 80 Misc. Rep. 487, 141 N. Y. S. 531;
Cohen v. Wolgel, (1919) 107 Misc. Rep. 505, 176 N. Y. S. 764; Pearl-
berg v. Levisohn, (1920) 112 Misc. Rep. 95, 182 N. Y. S. 615
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designations does not appear, however, the memorandum will be
held insufficient for lack of signature by the party to be charged. 03
The signature to the memorandum binding the party to be
charged may be affixed by the party himself or by a properly
authorized agent acting in his behalf.' 4 The authorization does
not need to be in writing and often appears merely by parol.20 5
As a general rule, an agent's authority to make the contract or
sale on behalf of the principal includes the incidental authority to
sign a memorandum on his behalf to make it legally enforce-
able.206 Thus, the signature by the agent who acts for the seller
is sufficient to bind the seller, though the seller does not personally
sign.2 0 7 Similarly, the signature by the agent of the buyer is suffi-
(clothing); United Display Fixture Co. v. Bauman, (App. Div. 1920)
183 N. Y. S. 4 (reorganized corporation adopting printed name of its
predecessor as its signature for the occasion); Cohen v. Walker, (App.
Div. 1922) 192 N. Y. S. 228; Schwartz v. Vigden, (1924) 210 App.
Div. 714, 206 N. Y. S. 321.
20 Lee v. Vaughan's Seed Store, (1911) 101 Ark. 68, 141 S. W. 496,
37 L. R. A. (N.S.) 352. In Upton Mill, etc., Co. v. Baldwin Flour
Mills, (1920) 147 Minn. 205, 179 N. W. 904 defendant corporation's
printed order form, with corporate name printed in signature form
accompanied by word and blank line "by . . . " placed on corporate
desk for authentication after being filled in by a clerk was held not
a signed memorandum in absence of the officer's authenticating sig-
nature. In Mesibov, Glinert & Levy v. Cohen Brothers Mfg. Co.,(1927) '245 N. Y. 305, 157 N. E. 148 defendant seller's name was
printed across the top of the order blank signed by the buyer, but
there was also a form clause providing for acceptance, followed by
a dotted line for the seller's signature. This signature was never
added. In Joseph Galin Co. v. Newhouse, (1920) 110 Misc. Rep. 680,
180 N. Y. S. 812 the printed name of defendant's predecessor in
business, appearing on old order blank forms in temporary use by de-
fendant pending arrival of new stationery properly printed was held not
to have been adopted as a signature.204Uniform Sales Act, sec. 4 (1); H. C. Dusenberry Inc. v. Im-
port Drug Co., (1925) 253 Mass. 368, 149 N. E. 118 (naptha-line
flakes).
205Roach v. Lane, (1917) 226 Mass. 598, 116 N. E. 470 (potatoes);
Evans, Coleman & Evans v. Pistorino, (1923) 245 Mass. 94, 139 N. E.
848 23 (giving broker orally an order to fill); Green & Bennett v. Mc-
Cormack, (1929) 83 N. H. 509, 144 Atl. 853; Henderson v. Baron,(App. Div. 1917) 164 N. Y. S. 697 (benzoate of soda); Hill v. Marcus,
(1923) 81 Pa. Super. Ct. 314 (eggs); McGowan v. Lustig-Burgerhoff
Co., (1928) 93 Pa. Super. Ct. 227 (tomatoes).
206Falletti v. Carrano, (1918) 92 Conn. 636, 103 AtI. 753 (flour);
Jacobson v. Perman, (1921) 238 Mass. 445, 131 N. E. 174 (cloth);
Evans, Coleman & Evans v. Pistorino, (1923) 245 Mass. 94, 139 N.
E. 848 (salmon).
207Jacobson v. Perman, (1921) 238 Mass. 445, 131 N. E. 174
(cloth); Moskowitz v. White Bros., (App. Div. 1917) 166 N. Y. S.
15 (automobile).
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cient to bind him without his personal signature.20 s Apparent
authority is as effective in this respect as express authority.209 The
signature in the name of the agent himself is sufficient to bind
the principal where the principal is undisclosed,21 0 and the same
has been held also in the case of a disclosed principal where the
signature in that form is authorized as the name under which the
principal's business is done for the occasion.211
It is well settled that one party to the transaction has not
capacity to act as agent for the other in signing the memoran-
dum.212 A third person may, however, with the knowledge and
authorization of both parties act for both in signing the memo-
randum. This position is frequently illustrated in cases of auc-
tioneers or their clerks while the auction is in progress,2 1 and in
cases of brokers in the commercial centers who negotiate contracts
or sales of merchandise between buyers and sellers with whom
they are in touch, but who are not directly in touch with each
other.21 4  Whether in any individual case the intermediate third
20SStraesser-Arnold Co. v. Franklin Sugar Refining Co., (C.C.A.
7th Cir. 1925) 8 F. (2d) 601 (sugar); Kinney v. Horwitz, (1919) 93
Conn. 211, 105 Atl. 438 (potatoes); Roach v. Lane, (1917) 226 Mass.
598, 116 N. E. 470 (potatoes); Evans, Coleman & Evans v. Pistorino,
(1923) 245 Mass. 94, 139 N. E. 848 (salmon); Hettreck Mfg.'Co. v.
Srere, (1926) 235 Mich. 306, 209 N. W. 97 (cotton goods); Bache v.
Bankograph Co., (1922) 120 Misc. Rep. 44, 197 N. Y. S. 663 (German
marks); Franklin Sugar Refining Co. v. Lipowicz, (1927) 22( App.
Div. 160, 221 N. Y. S. 11 (sugar); Hill v. Marcus, (1923) 81 Pa.
Super. Ct. 314 (eggs).2 0 0Hager v. Henneberger, (1913) 83 Misc. Rep. 417, 145 N. Y. S.
152 (eggs).
21OApollo Steel Co. v. C. H. Brushaber & Co., (1924) 210 App.
Div. 402, 206 N. Y. S. 301.
21Jacobson v. Perman, (1921) 238 Mass. 445, 131 N. E. 174
(cloth); Hager v. Henneberger, (1913) 83 Misc. Rep. 417, 145 N. Y. S.
152 (eggs); Baxter v. Lustberg, (1923) 205 App. Div. 673, 200 N. Y. S.
125 (cloth).
212Wright v. Dannah, (1809) 2 Camp. 203 (clover seed); Fare-
brother v. Simmons, (1822) 5 B. & Ald. 333 (turnips); Johnson &
Miller v. Buck, (1872) 35 N. J. L. 338, 10 Am. Rep. 243; Levitt v.
Shinnan, (App. Div. 1912) 137 N. Y. S. 904; Lezinsky Co. v. Hoffman,
(1920) 111 Misc. Rep. 415, 181 N. Y. S. 732. "'The theory is that it
would defeat the whole purpose of the statute if the other party,
who could not under the statute directly establish the contract by
oral testimony may do so indirectly by establishing by such testimony
that he was made the agent of the other to sign the note or memor-
andum." Mechem, Agency, 2nd ed., sec. 180.
*'ABird v. Boulter, (1833) 4 B. & Ad. 443; Johnson & Miller v.
Buck, (1872) 35 N. J. L. 338, 10 Am. Rep. 243; Sargent v. Bryan,
(1922) 153 Minn. 198, 189 N. W. 935.214 Prairie State Grain & Elevator Co. v. Wrede, (1920) 217 Ill.
App. 407 (corn); Green & Bennett v. McCormack, (1929) 83 N. H.
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person had authority to act as agent for both parties is a question
of fact which goes to the jury if the evidence on the matter is
conflicting. 21
5
SEC. 10. THE DECISIVE BEARING OF LEGAL PERSPECTIVE
The foregoing account of detail regarding the application of the
statute of frauds to current controversies under the Uniform Sales
Act readily illustrates how minute and technical often are the dis-
tinctions that have been taken in the application of the statute to
close bordeiline cases. It also indicates how the reasoning em-
ployed in drawing such distinctions often is literal and sometimes
becomes rather artificial and arbitrary. In such matters it is easy
in the mass of detail to lose sight of the perspective which guides
the choice of alternatives and in the long run largely determines
the course of development as novel borderline applications are
brought out with changing business conditions. The juristically
interested observer of legal phenomena can readily notice, how-
ever, that in the relatively novel borderline cases which arise with
changing business devices and business habits the essentially deter-
mining factor in the instance often appears to be the underlying
attitude taken by the court with regard to what it considers to be
the policy of the statute. If that underlying attitude is favorable
to the understood or assumed 1policy of the statute, the construc-
tion given in the instance may readily bring the case within the
509 144 At. 853 (potatoes); Henderson v. Baron, (App. Div. 1917)
164 N. Y. S. 697 (benzoate of soda); Cohn-Hall-Marx Co. v. Peaki,
(App. Div. 1918) 169 N. Y. S. 72; Childs v. Riley Co., (1919) 186
App. Div. 775, 174 N. Y. S. 840 (cotton); WQrcester Bleach & Dye
Works Co. v. Dugasch, (App. Div. 1920) 181 N. Y. S. 44 (sodium
sulphide); Gravenhorst v. Turner, (1926) 215 App. Div. 617, 213
N. Y. S. 468. In the following cases the memorandum signed by the
broker for the seller, was held insufficient to bind the bufer, authority
for the seller's broker to act for the buyer in signing the memorandum
not being made out in the facts shown: Rockford Mfg. Co. v. Massey,
(1926) 151 Md. 348, 133 Atl. 836, 47 A. L. R. 195 (cottonseed meal);
Dodd v. Stewart, (1923) 276 Pa. St. 225, 120 Atl. 121 (vessel); Rasche
v. Campbell, (1923) 276 Pa. St. 268 120 Atl. 132 (sugar); Franklin
Sugar Refining Co. v. Cane Milling & Grocery Co., (1923) 278 Pa.
St. 105, 122 Atl. 231, 29 A. L. R. 1213 (sugar); Franklin Sugar
Refining Co. v. John, (1924) 279 Pa. St. 104, 123 Atl. 685 (sugar);
Franklin Sugar Refining Co. v. Eiseman, (1927) 290 Pa. St. 486,
139 Atl. 147 (sugar); Paw-Paw Co-operative Ass'n v.'Sgarlatta, (1927)
91 Pa. Super. Ct. 436 (grapes).2 15Prairie State Grain & Elevator Co. v. Wrede, (1920) 217 Ill.
App. 407 (corn); McGowan v. Lustig-Burgerhoff.Co., (1928) 93 Pa.
Super. Ct. 227.
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statute and render the transaction unenforceable. If that under-
lying attitude is unfavorable to the understood or assumed policy
of the statute it may as readily give occasion for rigidly limiting
the application of the statute, thus saving the enforceability of the
particular transaction, either by bringing the case within the excep-
tions to the statute or by so interpreting the given facts as to find
that the statute has been satisfied. It therefore seems highly im-
portant, for intelligent advice or argument with respect to unsettled
novel borderline cases as they arise, not only to be familiar with
the labored specific detail of past applications of the statute, but
also to appreciate vividly the broader and deeper questions involved
with regard to the policy of the statute. To that end, therefore,
renewed careful attention must from time to time be given to
such fundamental questions as what that policy actually is and
whether the application of that policy to the novel situation in the
instant case is likely as a precedent to hinder or to promote the
general welfare. Adequate dealing with such questions, needless
to emphasize, requires both alert recognition and painstaking evalu-
ation of conflicting interests.
216
216See footnotes 9-16 above, with accompanying text.
